

Territorial Indivisibility and Public Preference for Dispute Resolution: Evidence from Japan *

Songying Fang
Rice University
sfang@rice.edu

Xiaojun Li
University of British Columbia
xiaojun.li@ubc.ca

Atsushi Tago
Waseda University and
Peace Research Institute Oslo
tago@waseda.jp

Daina Chiba
University of Essex
dchiba@essex.ac.uk

Abstract

Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these puzzles, and in many of the most intractable territorial disputes, such a belief may arise from the claim of historical ownership over these territories. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we investigate whether historical ownership engenders in respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and whether such a belief contributes to more hardline policy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that historical ownership does play a significant role in the respondents' perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with an alternative scenario involving no such prior ownership. Furthermore, those who hold a belief in indivisibility are more likely to support hardline policies and are much less likely to support bilateral negotiation. Finally, arbitration involving international organizations receives a high level of support irrespective of the divisibility of a disputed territory.

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1. Introduction

The Falklands/Malvinas dispute is one of the longest territorial disputes in the world today. It started in 1833 when Britain took control of the islands out of Spanish hands; Argentina protested the occupation immediately, claiming its sovereignty over the islands as Spain's successor. The territory has since been under the British control for nearly two centuries, but Argentina has consistently asserted its claim over the islands, despite having no feasible military solution to the dispute.¹ Moreover, Argentina has refused to accept any bilateral bargaining solution short of full Argentine sovereignty, even though a compromise solution would have given the country *something*, as opposed to nothing at all under the status quo (Laver 2001).

This phenomenon of a country neither relinquishing a territorial claim nor settling for a compromise is not unique to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. Another well known case in South America is Bolivia's continued claim to a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean that it lost to Chile in 1879. Bolivia has no realistic chance to win back its coast through military means, but it has consistently refused any compromise solution offered by Chile. In East Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea have all made total claims over disputed territories, and there has been no sign of compromise for over half a century. These disputes have not been in serious danger of escalation, but the potential exists, as occurred with the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Other long-running territorial disputes where both parties have made all-or-nothing claims, such as those over Jerusalem or Kashmir, have repeatedly resulted in violence and war.

Why do countries make indivisible sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago? How genuine are these claims in the sense that they lead to non-compromising policy stances? In his seminal work on the causes of war, Fearon (1995) identifies issue indivisibility as one of the three reasons that may lead to bargaining failure and war. However, he also points out that the empirical significance of issue indivisibility is limited because side payments or certain allocation mechanisms would allow compromise solutions even for such issues. Many scholars have come to share this view and see issue indivisibility primarily as

¹This is evidenced by a failed attempt to gain control of the islands by force in 1982.

a bargaining strategy (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2012, 115-117; Kydd 2015; Powell 2006; Henripin 2016; Wiegand 2011). On the other hand, Powell (2006) argues that issue indivisibility is fundamentally a commitment problem: in principle, actors can find a lottery to determine the allocation of such a good, but they may not be able to commit to honoring such an agreement *ex post*. Together, these arguments suggest that issue indivisibility by itself is not a compelling explanation for bargaining failure and war; rather, it is a reflection of some other dynamics at work in domestic and international politics.

These theories may very well be correct in that issue indivisibility cannot explain many or most bargaining failures. But we also cannot rule out the possibility that the problem lies at the heart of many intractable territorial disputes, such as those discussed earlier. The long histories of these disputes, as well as the countries' consistently uncompromising stances, beg further investigations of the role of issue indivisibility in conflict. Compared with other well-known causes of war, such as information and commitment problems, issue indivisibility has attracted relatively little attention, and there is a lack of rigorous empirical research testing the theory's implications.

Using a public opinion survey experiment conducted in Japan, we go beyond the existing studies on indivisibility in two ways. First, rather than treating a state as a unitary actor that may deem a territory indivisible, we examine the *beliefs* of individuals in a country regarding the divisibility of a disputed territory. Even within the same state, different individuals may have different beliefs on such matters, so our approach allows us to uncover how a particular characteristic of a territory may lead to a range of beliefs of the domestic public toward what constitutes an acceptable outcome of a dispute. Second, we examine the link between individuals' beliefs in the (in)divisibility of a disputed territory and their policy preferences towards the dispute. In doing so, we draw attention to domestic preferences that can lead to bargaining failure due to issue indivisibility.

There are a number of factors that are seen as contributing to a perception of territorial indivisibility, including (but not limited to) part of national homeland, ethnic ties, and historical ownership. We chose to focus on historical ownership as a source of indivisibility as it is most appropriate in the Asia-Pacific context where several ongoing territorial disputes

are making headlines. The dispute scenarios in our survey design aimed to be sufficiently realistic for the respondents to develop informed opinions. In particular, Japan has three ongoing territorial disputes: the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with China, the Northern territories/Kurile islands dispute with Russia, and the Takeshima/Dokdo islands dispute with South Korea. In all these disputes, Japan claims historical ownership. Some of the hypothetical scenarios match quite well with real-world cases, thereby providing us with additional insights about public perceptions about and preferences for the resolution of the real disputes.

Our main findings are as follows. First, a non-trivial proportion of respondents do develop a belief in territorial indivisibility when exposed to the scenario of historical ownership. The other two contextual variables that we included for comparison, the military strength of the opponent and the economic value of the territory, do not have a similar effect. Second, individuals who hold such a belief are more likely to support belligerent policy choices, such as economic sanctions and military actions, and much less likely to support bilateral negotiation. Third, arbitration involving international organizations (IO arbitration) receives a high level of support irrespective of the divisibility of a disputed territory. These findings suggest that issue indivisibility may be another channel through which domestic politics plays a role in international conflict. Given the incentive for a government to misrepresent domestic preferences to gain bargaining leverage, there could be a tendency for outsiders to underestimate the salience of an issue to a domestic public. Our findings suggest that such a miscalculation can, through the mechanism of issue indivisibility, lead to a breakdown in crisis bargaining. Our study thus cautions scholars and policy makers to pay close attention to the factors that contribute to domestic beliefs about a territorial dispute.

2. Territorial Indivisibility As a Belief

Territorial disputes present a difficult case for an issue indivisibility argument: a territory is often physically divisible, even if it consists of rock. What does it mean, then, when a country insists that a disputed territory cannot be divided and it owns the whole of it? Typically, a country claims that it has exclusive *sovereignty* over a disputed territory; that is, what is

indivisible is a country's rightful ownership of a territory rather than the territory itself. In addition, such claims almost always imply that sovereignty cannot be traded for something else. While it is possible that such claims are a bargaining strategy, given the persistence of the claims in many of the long-lasting territorial disputes, we cannot rule out the possibility that they represent genuine beliefs. That is, the citizens of a nation may genuinely believe in territorial indivisibility, believe that in the case of the disputed territory, their nation has exclusive sovereignty that can be neither shared nor exchanged for something else.

So why may a belief in territorial indivisibility arise? Scholars who argue that issue indivisibility is an important explanation for conflict have identified territories with intangible values, such as a homeland or a sacred site, to be sources of such a belief (Hassner 2003; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Toft 2006), but the relationship is largely assumed rather than empirically established. On the other hand, a vast literature on territorial disputes has shown that territories with intangible salience to a nation due to historical, cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic ties are more likely to lead to severe conflict,² but few studies show why territories with such characteristics are more likely to lead to bargaining breakdown and thus military conflict.³ Missing in the link are individuals' beliefs, which may be functions of the characteristics of a territory, about what outcomes are acceptable. Further, in both literatures, states or groups—rather than individuals—are seen as the unitary actors who hold such beliefs.

We depart from the existing research on territorial disputes and issue indivisibility in two ways. First, we take as a starting point that it is actors' beliefs rather than the physical characteristics of a territory that make a territorial issue indivisible. This then leads us to relax the unitary actor assumption and measure the beliefs of members of the public to understand how such a belief may arise and influence policy stances. Numerous studies have shown that territorial disputes are particularly sensitive to public sentiment and are more likely to escalate as a result (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller 2012; Vasquez 1993, 2009). More

²For a non-exhaustive sample of the works that arrive at the conclusion, see Gibler, Hutchison and Miller (2012), Goertz and Diehl (1992), Hensel (1999), Hensel et al. (2008), Hensel and Mitchell (2005), Herb and Kaplan (1999), Newman (1999), Shelef (2016), and Zellman (2015).

³An exception to this line work is Hensel and Mitchell (2005), which finds evidence that territorial disputes involving greater intangible values are more likely to produce both costly wars and peaceful agreements.

recently, empirical studies from Israel, China, and South Korea, have shown that leaders can come under tremendous pressure to meet public expectations on territorial disputes (Manekin et al. forthcoming; Quek and Johnston 2017; Wiegand and Choi 2017). Being seen as tough to an opponent in a long-standing territorial dispute can increase a leader's popularity (Hwang et. al. 2018), but making concessions to historical rivals can lead to leader removal (Colaresi 2004).

Second, we investigate whether a belief in territorial indivisibility arises from one of the intangible factors identified in the voluminous literature on territorial disputes, namely, historical ownership. Not only is it the most relevant factor in the Japanese context, historical ownership is also the most frequently invoked justification for territorial claims (Murphy 1990). It has been well established that for leaders, such a justification may be strategic for it provides legitimacy for their territorial claims and helps signal the limit of their designs (Abramson and Carter 2016; Goddard 2006; Wiegand 2011). What is much less understood is the mechanism through which a public may develop a belief in territorial indivisibility as a result of their country's historical claim of a disputed territory. A claim of historical ownership implies that the disputed territory was wrongly taken away from its rightful owner (Fang and Li 2019). Because the event or the process of losing the territory is seen as unjust by a nation, some members may feel that the injustice can only be undone when the lost territory is fully recovered. For these individuals, then, historical ownership is key to their perception of the indivisibility of a disputed territory.

Because individuals can have different beliefs, we first measure the belief of each respondent regarding the divisibility of a hypothetical disputed territory. We then examine the effect of such beliefs on respondents' policy preferences regarding the resolution of the dispute. Consequently, we test two main hypotheses. The first examines whether invoking historical ownership increases the number of respondents who believe in the indivisibility of a disputed territory. The second examines the effect of the belief on respondents' policy preferences about the resolution of the dispute.

H1: *A country's historical ownership of a disputed territory will make its citizens more likely to perceive the territory to be indivisible.*

H2: *The belief of territorial indivisibility makes citizens more likely to support more hardline policies in resolving these disputes.*

3. Experimental Design

The survey was administered in September 2016 by Nikkei Research, an Internet marketing research firm in Japan. There were two modules in our survey. In Module A, respondents read a hypothetical territorial dispute scenario with three embedded randomized features: historical ownership of the territory, the military strength of the potential opponent, and whether or not the territory has economic values. While our hypotheses were concerned with the effect of historical ownership, we included the two additional features to account for possible confounding (military and economic) factors in shaping the responses. We asked respondents to carefully consider the hypothetical scenario without trying to match it with a real dispute.⁴

Japan is involved in a dispute with a [militarily strong/weak] neighboring country over a piece of territory (an island). This territory [has economic value/the economic value is unknown], and [historically belonged to Japan/historically belonged to the neighboring country/historically did not belong to any country].

After reading the scenario, respondents were asked two questions in sequence. The first question aimed to test our first hypothesis regarding the effect of historical ownership as a source of a belief in territorial indivisibility. We avoided asking directly whether respondents thought that the disputed territory in the hypothetical scenario was divisible or not, because such a direct question might have resulted in respondents overwhelmingly choosing the socially desirable answer—indivisible. Instead, we sought to infer respondents' beliefs from their expressed preferences over plausible dispute outcomes. Specifically, we presented the four most realistic outcomes of the dispute, then asked whether the respondents found each outcome acceptable or unacceptable, or whether they were “unsure.”⁵ The four outcomes

⁴We added a statement to this effect because in the pretest some respondents said that they could not match hypothetical scenarios with Japan's real disputes.

⁵We avoided using unrealistic outcomes in the Japanese context because they might have negatively affected the thoughtfulness of responses.

were:

1. Japan and the neighboring country jointly hold the sovereignty and jointly use the territory.
2. Japan alone holds sovereignty over the disputed territory, but the two countries jointly use the territory.
3. Japan will independently maintain sovereignty and monopolize the use of the disputed territory. However, Japan will provide financial or political compensation to the neighboring country. Both countries have agreed on the content of compensation. [Also, the agreement will be monitored by international organizations such as the UN and the International Court of Justice./none.]
4. Japan will independently maintain sovereignty and monopolize the use of the disputed territory. Japan does not provide any compensation for the neighboring country.

The four outcomes are all realistic in that they were proposed at different times in the real disputes involving Japan. This would allow the respondents to more easily envision what the options would look like. The outcomes are differentiated by their divisibility: they are different combinations of who owns the sovereignty and the right to use the disputed territory. The first two outcomes allow joint sovereignty and/or joint use of the territory, and thus are “divisible” outcomes. The last two outcomes do not allow sharing of either, and thus are “indivisible” outcomes with one allowing side payments to facilitate a compromise solution. For this outcome, we additionally told half of the respondents that the agreement would be monitored by international organizations such as the UN and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This design allowed us to explore whether respondents were concerned about the credibility of a bilateral agreement.

In the second question, respondents were given seven policy options, ranging from propaganda campaign to full military actions, following a statement: “The Japanese government has taken or can take the following policies regarding territorial disputes.” The statement was to remind the respondents that all the policies presented were within the realms of possibility, including the more peaceful measures. This would provide a hard test of our second hypothesis regarding the link between individuals’ beliefs in territorial indivisibility

and their policy preferences. We then asked the respondents whether they found each of the following option appropriate for the hypothetical dispute scenario that they just read or were “unsure”. The policy options were: strengthen external propaganda, stimulate public opinion in Japan, and urge citizens to express dissatisfaction with the neighboring country; enact economic sanctions on the neighboring country, stop official visits, and cancel cooperative projects; negotiate with the neighboring country to make a compromise; bring the dispute to international organizations such as the UN and the ICJ, for international arbitration; shelve the dispute and jointly develop resources; dispatch the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with limited military action to protect the territory against the neighboring country; dispatch SDF with full military actions against the neighboring country, with the possibility of leading to war, in order to protect the territory. These ordering of these options were randomized.

Taken together, the seven options cover all possible policies realistically available to the Japanese government. In particular, the Japanese government has advocated international arbitration for some of its disputes. It would be interesting to compare the attitudes toward this policy with those toward “shelving the dispute”, a policy that has been advocated by the Chinese government. Respondents who found international arbitration acceptable received a follow-up question: “Do you think that Japan should abide by the decision made by the UN or the ICJ, whatever the outcome may be?” The possible answers to this question were “yes,” “If it is not a ruling that will benefit Japan, it is not necessary to follow,” and “unsure.”

After completing the two questions, respondents were asked whether they had envisioned an actual territorial dispute when they were answering the two questions. If the answer was “yes,” we asked them to specify the dispute. This concluded Module A. In Module B we asked typical socio-demographic questions.

4. Data and Results

The respondents were randomly drawn from Nikkei Research’s online subject pool of over 145,000 panelists, who take surveys in exchange for the opportunity to win cash prizes.⁶

⁶For recent studies that employed Nikkei Research, see, for example, Kohama et al. 2017; Tago and Ikeda 2015.

The sampling was implemented to match the national average in terms of geographical locations, and yielded a sample of 2,621 Japanese adults.⁷ After reading the introduction, each respondent was given one of the hypothetical scenarios of a territorial dispute and the two questions as described above (Module A).⁸

In terms of the (self-reported) demographic characteristics, the average age of the respondents is 47, the male/female ratio is 52%/48%, and 56.85% have college degrees. Moreover, 26.9% of the respondents have an annual income less than 3.5 million Yen, and 22.7% have incomes over 8.3 million Yen; thus, 50.4% of the respondents fall in the middle-income group. These numbers are comparable to the national average, and reflect Japan's unique demographic composition, namely an older and more educated population.⁹ In addition, 69.55% of the respondents work either full-time or part-time, and 25.52% support the LDP, the ruling party. In terms of the knowledge relevant for our study, 79.4% answered that they are very or fairly interested in Japan's foreign affairs.¹⁰

4.1 Historical Ownership and a Belief in Territorial Indivisibility

Figure 1 summarizes the average level of support for the dispute outcomes over the three historical ownership scenarios. The vertical axis represents the proportion of support, and the horizontal axis lists possible outcomes of the dispute. As explained in the last section, we asked respondents to consider both divisible and indivisible outcomes of the dispute; further, to account for the possibility of third-party enforcement, for the side-payment outcome, we told half of the respondents that the agreement would be monitored by international organizations. The small circles, triangles, and squares in the figure are the point estimates for the proportion of respondents who found the outcomes acceptable given different scenarios

⁷The percentage of sample respondents drawn from the six regions in Japan (Hokkaido-Tohoku, Kanto-Koshinetsu, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku-Shikoku and Kusu-Okinawa) are 11.75%, 36.59%, 14.96%, 16.71%, 8.74%, and 11.26%, respectively. The national averages (as of 2014) are 11.36%, 37.82%, 14.20%, 16.33%, 8.90%, and 11.39%.

⁸We include in the survey two attention checking questions, asking respondents to make a specific choice. The vast majority of the respondents were paying attention; only 62 out of 2,621 failed both attention checking questions. The results that we present in the paper are from the full sample.

⁹See Appendix C for a comparison of our sample with the census data in terms of age, gender, education, and income, showing that our sample is nationally representative on these key demographic variables.

¹⁰Summary statistics for the sample can be found in Appendix B.

of historical ownership; the bars are 95% confidence intervals.¹¹




Figure 1: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes, Varying in Historical Ownership.*

We highlight two main findings in Figure 1. First, consistent with Hypothesis 1, historical ownership made a difference in the respondents’ preferences regarding the most divisible and indivisible outcomes, but in opposite directions. In particular, Japan’s historical ownership of the territory made respondents much less likely to support joint sovereignty and joint use of the territory (25% vs. 42% or 45%), compared with the two alternative scenarios of historical ownership. Conversely, Japan’s historical ownership of the disputed territory significantly increased the proportion of respondents who found the most extreme indivisible outcome (Japan has sovereignty and the exclusive right to use) acceptable. Both results are statistically significant. Second, adding IO enforcement made no difference in the respondents’ preferences for the indivisible outcome with a side payment, suggesting that there is

¹¹In this figure, as well as in all of the remaining results, we omit respondents who replied that they were unsure” (about 20-25% of the respondents). See appendix D for the results that combined the indecisive responses with the “unacceptable” ones. The results were very similar.

no particular concern about the enforcement of the agreement.

Overall, the respondents cared much more about the specific outcome of the dispute if Japan had historical ownership. In the scenarios where Japan did not have historical ownership, the support levels for different outcomes did not differ greatly, whether in the case of foreign historical ownership or the case of “owned by neither.” But in the case of Japanese historical ownership, there was a wider distribution of preferences.

Did other characteristics of the dispute affect respondents’ outcome preferences? In particular, did the cost of war—roughly captured by the military strength of the neighboring country—influence their responses? The answer is negative. We find that neither the neighboring country’s military strength nor the economic value of the territory affected the respondents’ outcome preferences. The only finding worthy of note is that military strength influenced the preference over the extreme indivisible outcome in an unexpected direction, which can be seen in Figure 2. Those respondents who read that “the neighboring country is militarily strong” were more likely to favor the indivisible outcome where Japan makes no compromise.¹² In other words, the cost of war against a strong opponent did not deter the choice of the indivisible outcome. Beyond this finding, there was little difference between the responses to the two scenarios.

To sum, these findings confirm that historical ownership engendered in some respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and thus reduced their willingness to accept outcomes that involve joint sovereignty, joint use of the disputed territory, and compromise in the form of side payments. No other contextual variables had the same effect.

4.2 Territorial Indivisibility and Policy Preferences

We now turn to our second hypothesis and investigate whether a belief in territorial indivisibility affected respondents’ policy preferences regarding the hypothetical dispute. In order to do so, we constructed a measure of each respondent’s belief in the (degree of) indivisibility of the disputed territory based on their answers to the first survey question. More specifically, we divided the respondents into two groups: the “hardcore indivisible” group

¹²The results for economic value are presented in Appendix A.




Figure 2: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes, Varying with Neighbor's Military Strength.*

and the “compromise possible” group. We put in the “hardcore indivisible” group those respondents who answered “acceptable” only to the indivisible outcome where Japan does not make any compromise. The rest of the respondents were relegated to the “compromise possible” group—these respondents found acceptable either some sort of sharing of the territory or no sharing but making side payments to the neighboring country. We dropped the 232 respondents who were unsure about all of the outcomes. Out of the remaining 2,389 respondents, 381 belong to the “hardcore indivisible” group.

Figure 3 presents the proportion of “hardcore indivisible” respondents for each value of the three contextual variables. The proportion of individuals who held the extreme belief is noticeably higher under the hypothetical scenario where Japan historically owned the disputed territory than that in the rest of the cases. The pairwise differences between this proportion and the others are all statistically significant. These results reaffirm our




Figure 3: *Proportion of Hardcore Indivisible by Contextual Variable.*

first hypothesis that historical ownership is more likely to lead to a perception of territory indivisibility, prompting citizens to reject all but the most demanding indivisible outcome.

It is also informative to examine the differences between the two groups by their sociodemographic and attitudinal variables. The sociodemographic variables include age, gender, education, employment, annual income, social status, interest in international affairs, and party affiliation;¹³ the attitudinal variables include respondents' views on national defense, and measures of their nationalism and conservatism.¹⁴ We find that the “hardcore indivis-

¹³Annual income is measured on a seven-point scale with 1 indicating less than 3.5 million Yen (approximately \$33,772) and 5 indicating more than 8.3 million Yen (\$80,089). Social status is respondents' self-perceived status as determined by wealth on a 10-point scale from poorest to richest. Interest in international affairs is measured on a four-point scale from “very interested” to “not interested at all.” Party affiliation is based on a question asking respondents which political party they support. Respondents are divided into three groups: those that support the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party; those that support other parties; and those that do not support any particular party.

¹⁴National defense is measured as whether or not a respondent ranks national defense as the top issue facing Japan (as opposed to economic development, social stability, democracy, corruption, income inequality, or environmental protection). Nationalism is a composite index based on their answers to the following five statements: “I am very proud to be Japanese,” “I would rather be a Japanese citizen than a citizen of

ible” respondents have lower perceived social status, are more interested in international affairs, are more likely to view national defense as the top issue facing Japan, and are more nationalistic.¹⁵ Interestingly, the perception of territorial indivisibility is not correlated with ruling party affiliation. This suggests that policies regarding territorial disputes are unlikely to shift radically with a change of government as long as public opinion on the matter constrains a government; territorial issues will be equally salient regardless of which party is in power.

Now we use logistic regression to analyze the effect of the perceived territorial indivisibility on a respondent’s choice of policy. We code indivisibility as a binary measure that equals 1 for the “hardcore indivisible” group and 0 for the “compromise possible” group. There is a range of controls in the model, including the three contextual variables (historical ownership, economic value, neighbor’s military strength) and the battery of sociodemographic variables mentioned earlier. The results are presented in Table 1. If the coefficient for the variable “indivisible” is statistically significant for a policy option, then it means there is a difference in the policy preference between the “hardcore indivisible” group and the “compromise possible” group. We can see that except for the policy option of IO arbitration, the differences in support for the remaining options are all statistically significant. Moreover, the respondents in the hardcore indivisible group are more likely to support belligerent policies, such as economic sanctions and limited as well as full military action, but less likely to support bilateral negotiation and shelving the dispute. These results are consistent with our second hypothesis.

any other country,” “Japan is the greatest country in the world,” “I am proud of Japan’s long history and culture” and “Japan should first take care of its self-interest, even if this means having conflict with other countries.” Conservatism is measured on a 11-point scale based on a question asking respondents whether they are more conservative or progressive.

¹⁵These results are based on a logistic regression with “hardcore indivisible” (a dichotomous measure) as the independent variable.

Table 1: Support for Policy Positions Regarding the Disputed Territory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.886** (0.144)	0.893** (0.143)	-1.733** (0.144)	-0.0378 (0.214)	-1.619** (0.193)	0.746** (0.142)	0.772** (0.143)
Historically Japanese	0.409** (0.127)	0.211 (0.134)	-0.385** (0.146)	0.375 (0.192)	-0.761** (0.134)	0.0948 (0.125)	-0.115 (0.139)
Historically Foreign	-0.346** (0.127)	-0.203 (0.137)	-0.0492 (0.149)	0.0838 (0.181)	-0.332* (0.129)	-0.400** (0.125)	-0.233 (0.140)
Nationalism	1.124** (0.200)	0.873** (0.214)	0.158 (0.219)	0.775** (0.264)	-0.284 (0.197)	1.140** (0.193)	1.132** (0.224)
Strong Neighbor	0.199 (0.103)	0.0625 (0.110)	0.00311 (0.119)	0.395** (0.153)	-0.0471 (0.107)	0.243* (0.101)	-0.0596 (0.113)
Valuable	0.227* (0.104)	0.0694 (0.110)	-0.207 (0.119)	0.0214 (0.152)	-0.0468 (0.108)	0.0533 (0.101)	0.0101 (0.114)
Age	2.22e-05 (0.00416)	-0.0262** (0.00440)	0.0156** (0.00477)	0.0238** (0.00607)	0.00835 (0.00428)	-0.0272** (0.00410)	-0.0276** (0.00456)
Male	0.491** (0.120)	0.632** (0.129)	-0.238 (0.137)	-0.113 (0.172)	0.0206 (0.124)	0.339** (0.117)	0.768** (0.135)
College Degree	-0.0633 (0.115)	-0.103 (0.123)	0.190 (0.133)	0.118 (0.170)	0.223 (0.119)	-0.107 (0.113)	-0.370** (0.127)
Full-time Job	0.00771 (0.126)	-0.0950 (0.132)	-0.210 (0.145)	-0.0182 (0.177)	0.0575 (0.130)	0.0859 (0.123)	0.238 (0.137)
Part-time Job	-0.0887 (0.164)	-0.118 (0.182)	-0.0922 (0.190)	0.471 (0.273)	0.119 (0.172)	0.0935 (0.161)	-0.252 (0.195)
Income	0.00895 (0.0406)	0.0295 (0.0426)	0.0705 (0.0462)	0.0614 (0.0580)	-0.0607 (0.0421)	0.0431 (0.0393)	-0.0316 (0.0446)
Social Status	-0.0759* (0.0342)	-0.124** (0.0355)	-0.00102 (0.0384)	-0.0831 (0.0487)	0.0993** (0.0348)	-0.0836* (0.0330)	-0.0533 (0.0364)
International Affairs	0.177* (0.0840)	0.0706 (0.0874)	0.199* (0.0922)	0.249* (0.117)	0.112 (0.0866)	0.128 (0.0824)	0.173 (0.0923)
National Defense	0.484** (0.110)	0.442** (0.115)	-0.364** (0.124)	-0.191 (0.161)	-0.495** (0.116)	0.571** (0.108)	0.643** (0.117)
LDP	0.123 (0.151)	0.270 (0.158)	-0.392* (0.175)	0.365 (0.218)	-0.364* (0.157)	0.563** (0.146)	0.250 (0.158)
No Political Party	-0.0294 (0.129)	0.0388 (0.140)	-0.255 (0.154)	0.334 (0.184)	-0.254 (0.131)	0.0364 (0.127)	-0.153 (0.146)
Conservatism	0.0670* (0.0280)	0.0720* (0.0295)	-0.0532 (0.0322)	-0.0401 (0.0409)	-0.0853** (0.0289)	0.0754** (0.0273)	0.0970** (0.0301)
Constant	-2.347** (0.386)	-1.036** (0.400)	0.930* (0.425)	-0.293 (0.543)	-0.0931 (0.402)	-0.858* (0.378)	-1.830** (0.416)
Observations	1,760	1,809	1,842	1,963	1,694	1,859	1,920
Pseudo R-squared	0.102	0.0966	0.118	0.0449	0.0982	0.115	0.132
LR χ^2	246.5	214.1	239	58.38	220.3	295.7	292.2
Prob< χ^2	0	0	0	3.74e-06	0	0	0

Dependent variables for models (1)–(7) are: (1)=publicity, (2)=economic sanction, (3)=bilateral negotiation, (4)=IO arbitration, (5)=shelving the dispute, (6)=limited military action and (7)=full military action. Standard errors in parentheses. ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$.

One may wonder whether the above results reflect the logic of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which says that individuals tend to be risk acceptant in the domain of losses. If prospect theory was at work during the survey, then those respondents who were told that Japan owned the disputed territory historically should be more likely to support risky policy options such as military action. However, this is not what we find in Table 1. The historical ownership variable by itself did not have a statistically significant effect on either limited or full military action, nor did it lead to more support for economic sanctions, another potentially risky policy option. In other words, only through the mechanism of perceived indivisibility did historical ownership play a role in promoting more hardline policy preferences.

We have also conducted two robustness checks of our results. First, we constructed a measure based on item response theory (IRT) (Hambleton and Swaminathan 1985; Hambleton et al. 1991), which allows for a continuous measure of a respondent’s degree of belief in indivisibility. The results using the measure are substantively similar to the findings using the binary measure that we present in the main text.¹⁶ Second, to allow for the possibility that proximity to real disputes may influence respondents’ policy preferences,¹⁷ we added an additional control variable that measures the (minimum) geographic distance between a respondent’s prefecture and Japan’s three disputed territories. The results with the inclusion of this new variable once again are similar to our main findings.¹⁸

4.3 Additional Findings

To further examine how a belief in territorial indivisibility affected respondents’ preference rankings of the different policy choices, in Figure 4 we juxtapose the predicted probabilities of support for each policy for both the “hardcore indivisible” and “compromise possible” groups. For the “compromise possible” group, most notably, bilateral negotiation and IO arbitration both received extremely high support. Generally speaking, this group’s level of support decreases as the policy options become more bellicose, with the lowest proportion (19%)

¹⁶See Appendix E for the result using the IRT measure.

¹⁷Tanaka (2016) finds that residents closer to disputes are more likely to support a compromise than those who live further away.

¹⁸See Appendix F for details.




Figure 4: *Two Groups' Predicted Probability of Support for Each Policy Position.* The other variables are held at their median.

supporting full military action. Surprisingly, there is less support for economic sanctions than for limited military action. Turning to the “hardcore indivisible” group, IO arbitration again ranks at the top, followed by limited military action. Similar to the “compromise possible” group, the support for economic sanctions falls behind limited military actions. Overall, the hardcore group favors more combative policies, which include economic sanctions, as well as limited and full military action. The differences between the two groups’ percentages of support for various policies are all statistically significant and the substantive differences are large. These findings provide strong support for our second hypothesis, which is that those who hold the belief that a disputed territory is indivisible are more likely to support contentious policy options than those who do not.

Three findings stand out and yield interesting insights about Japanese public opinion and domestic politics. First, for both groups, IO arbitration receives the most support and

the level is similar (88% and 86%). This suggests that the Japanese public has a strongly favorable view about international arbitration as a mechanism for conflict resolution; indeed, the Japanese government has proposed this option in the past, which was opposed by other countries. In contrast, while the support level for “shelving the dispute,” a policy first proposed by China, is relatively high at 61% for the “compromised possible” group, it drops to the bottom for the “hardcore indivisible” group. Second, for both groups, the support for economic sanctions falls between the support for limited military action and full military action. It is highly likely that the respondents considered the costs of different actions, and viewed the costs of economic sanctions as greater than those of limited military action, but smaller than those of full military action. Third, the differences between the levels of support for different policy options are very large between the two groups. For example, the “hardcore indivisible” group is 33%, 39%, and 38% more likely to support economic sanctions, limited military action, and full military action, respectively, than the “compromise possible” group. This finding suggests that in Japan, the distance between moderates and hardliners is rather large.

Table 1 also revealed how individuals’ characteristics affected respondents’ support for different policies. Unsurprisingly, nationalism played a significant role. It increased the support for all combative policies, from economic sanctions to both limited and full military action. But somewhat paradoxically, it also increased the support for IO arbitration. This positive attitude toward IO arbitration in association with nationalism perhaps indicates a favorable view of IOs by the Japanese public, and/or an expectation that a ruling would be in Japan’s interest. A further finding is that of those who said IO arbitration was appropriate for resolving the dispute, 78% said “yes” to the statement “Japan should abide by the decision made by the UN or the ICJ, whatever the outcome may be.”

Older people and college graduates were less supportive of conflictual policies such as economic sanctions and military action. In contrast, males and those who thought national defense was the most important issue facing Japan were more likely to support such measures. Finally, higher social status correlates with less support for economic sanctions and IO arbitration. It is easy to understand why individuals with higher social status would be reluctant to endorse economic sanctions on a neighboring country: such measures may hurt

Japan’s economy as well and subsequently their self-interest. However, it is less clear why the same type of individuals would oppose IO arbitration. It could be that IO arbitration was viewed as creating more tension between Japan and its neighbors—China and South Korea have both opposed third-party arbitrations of their disputes with Japan—and thus negatively affecting their economic well-being.

5. Real vs. Hypothetical Disputes

Recall that in the survey, respondents were told that they did not need to think of a particular territorial dispute when they read the hypothetical scenario. However, due to the high salience of Japan’s existing territorial disputes and their similarity with some of the hypothetical scenarios, it is entirely possible that respondents were thinking about a particular dispute when they answered the questions. Indeed, we found that in our survey, 1,410 out of the 2,621 respondents said “yes” when we asked them at the end of Module A whether or not they had a particular real dispute in mind when answering the survey questions. We focus on this group of respondents in this section.¹⁹

As described earlier, we asked those respondents who said they had a particular dispute in mind to further elaborate in a follow-up question. Sifting through the 1,410 answers, we focus on those that touch on Japan’s three main territorial disputes, which are with China, Russia, and South Korea. To facilitate comparison, we removed respondents who mentioned multiple disputes. In total, 423 respondents were thinking (only) about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with China; 207 were thinking (only) about the Northern territories/Kurile islands dispute with Russia; and 135 were thinking (only) about the Takeshima/Dokdo islands dispute with South Korea.

Using the same specifications in Table 1, we reanalyzed the effect of the indivisibility measure on policy preferences in the three groups of respondents using logistic regressions. The resulting coefficient plots for each of the seven policy outcomes are presented in Figure 5. For a clear visual presentation, we omitted the contextual variables and sociodemographic

¹⁹The results for the respondents who did not have any real dispute in mind are nearly identical to the main findings reported in the previous section. See Appendix G for details.




Figure 5: *Coefficient Estimate of “Hardcore Indivisible” on Respondents’ Policy Preferences by Dispute.* Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals for the “hardcore indivisible” variable were obtained from logistic regressions using the same specifications as in Table 1. Other variables were omitted for brevity.

controls, but the full results can be found in the appendix.²⁰ Similar to the results in Table 1, those who believed the disputed territory to be indivisible (the “hardcore indivisible” group) were less likely to pick bilateral negotiation regardless of which real dispute they had in mind. For the remaining policy options, however, the differences between the “hardcore indivisible” and “compromise possible” groups vary considerably depending on which dispute they had in mind.

In the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with China, the “hardcore indivisible” group was less likely to support shelving the dispute, but was indifferent between the other options. That is, the group does not find the policy proposed by China in the past on the dispute appealing. For those thinking about the Northern territories/Kurile islands dispute with Russia, the “hardcore indivisible” group preferred publicity and economic sanctions. In

²⁰See Appendix H for full results.

the case of the dispute with South Korea, the “hardcore indivisible” group was more supportive of the three belligerent policy options (economic sanctions, limited and full military actions). The variation across the three cases is informative. It suggests that respondents were likely taking into account the potential costs when evaluating the policy options in each real dispute, and were reluctant to resort to military actions against Russia (a powerful military opponent), and economic sanctions against China (Japan’s largest trading partner).

6. Conclusion

Compared with the informational problem and the commitment problem, issue indivisibility—the third of the three causes of war identified in the bargaining theory of war—has attracted significantly less in the way of rigorous theoretical and empirical research. Yet in many highly salient territorial disputes in the world today, a common feature is that disputants claim the whole of a disputed territory, leaving no room for compromise, and have done so consistently for decades or even for over a century. Such a phenomenon calls for a better understanding of issue indivisibility, at least in the context of territorial disputes, and its effect on policy preferences. In this article, we provide one of the first direct empirical evidence of how an intangible characteristic of a disputed territory may give rise to a belief in territorial indivisibility, which then generates policy preferences that may lead to conflict. The survey results from Japan support our two main hypotheses, namely, that historical ownership contributes to a belief in territorial indivisibility, and that such a belief increases support for more contentious policies to resolve territorial disputes.

Our analysis further suggests that territorial indivisibility often lies in the beliefs of actors rather than the nature of a territory. But measuring beliefs is challenging because if we ask respondents directly whether a disputed territory is divisible, we are unlikely to receive highly reliable responses because of social desirability bias. The survey design we developed address this challenge and allows us to measure respondents’ (latent) beliefs through their revealed preferences regarding the outcomes of a dispute. Historical ownership is not the only plausible source of a belief in territorial indivisibility, though it is the most frequently invoked. Thus, our research design can be modified to apply to other intangible cultural,

religious and ethnic characteristics of territories to further investigate the relevance of issue indivisibility as a cause of war.

Our arguments and findings do not suggest that leaders are always truthful when they make claims about indivisible territories. It is well understood that as strategic actors, leaders have an incentive to use such an argument simply to gain more leverage at the bargaining table. We have no direct means to distinguish between such a strategic incentive and a genuine belief in indivisibility, held either by leaders themselves or by their constituency, who binds their hands. The challenge for scholars, then, is to carefully design empirical studies that can tease out the differences as best as they can. A misjudgement about the beliefs of leaders or publics could lead to conflict in much the same way as a miscalculation about military capability and the cost of war.

How generalizable are our findings from Japan to other countries? Japan is certainly not unique in having long-lasting territorial disputes and a history of varying territorial boundaries; thus, there is no reason to think that our main findings are specific only to Japan. In fact, our analysis from a similar survey in China show that the main findings regarding historical ownership are robust across these two countries. Where we observe different patterns between the two countries stem from the specific domestic political and economic contexts. For example, we find that the Japanese public generally supports IO arbitration regardless of whether Japan has historical ownership of a disputed territory or not, and whether individuals perceive the territory to be indivisible or not, whereas in China there is a general aversion to IO arbitration. Exploring the similarities and differences across different countries will be a natural extension of this research.

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7. Appendix

A. The Results for the Contextual Variable “Economic Value”




Figure 6: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.

B. Descriptive Statistics of the Sociodemographic Data of the Respondents

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	Obs	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Indivisibility (Binary)	2389	0.16	0	0.37	0	1
Indivisibility (IRT)	2389	-0.01	0.02	0.79	-1.18	0.99
Proud to be Japanese	2621	0.81	1	0.39	0	1
I'd Rather be Japanese Citizen	2621	0.75	1	0.43	0	1
Japan is the Greatest Country	2621	0.48	0	0.5	0	1
Proud of Japanese History & Culture	2621	0.76	1	0.43	0	1
Japan Should Put Its Interest First	2621	0.29	0	0.45	0	1
Nationalism Index	2621	0.62	1	0.31	0	1
Age	2621	47.04	46	13.57	21	69
Gender (Male = 1)	2621	0.52	1	0.5	0	1
College Degree (= 1)	2621	0.57	1	0.5	0	1
Fulltime Job (= 1)	2621	0.46	0	0.5	0	1
Parttime Job (= 1)	2621	0.15	0	0.36	0	1
Income	2611	2.9	3	1.52	1	5
Social Status	2621	4.82	5	1.83	0	10
Interest in Japan's Foreign Affairs	2621	2.97	3	0.75	1	4
National Defense Top Issue	2621	0.38	0	0.49	0	1
Liberal Democratic Party	2621	0.26	0	0.44	0	1
No Political Party	2621	0.49	0	0.50	0	1
Conservatism	2371	5.49	5	1.98	0	10

C. Sample Comparison

The following table compares a number of key demographic variables of our sample with those of the most recent census in Japan. The comparison suggests that our sample is representative of the national average.

Table 3: Sample comparison

Variable	National Survey	Our Sample	Difference
Age	47.04	46.1	0.94
Male	0.53	0.52	0.01
Education	0.53	0.57	-0.04
Income	3.1	2.9	0.2

Data source: 2015 Japan Population Census (for age and education) and the 2015 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (for gender and income).

D. Main results including the “unsure” responses




Figure 7: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.




Figure 8: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.




Figure 9: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.

E. Table 1 Using the IRT Measure of Indivisibility

Table 4: Support for Policy Positions Regarding the Disputed Territory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.399** (0.0684)	0.435** (0.0714)	-1.279** (0.0906)	-0.477** (0.104)	-1.273** (0.0789)	0.415** (0.0663)	0.389** (0.0739)
Historically Japanese	0.370** (0.127)	0.200 (0.134)	-0.314* (0.149)	0.472* (0.194)	-0.644** (0.144)	0.0566 (0.126)	-0.118 (0.139)
Historically Foreign	-0.365** (0.128)	-0.211 (0.137)	0.00509 (0.153)	0.0976 (0.182)	-0.341* (0.140)	-0.416** (0.126)	-0.237 (0.140)
Nationalism	1.112** (0.199)	0.858** (0.213)	0.171 (0.223)	0.864** (0.264)	-0.140 (0.214)	1.121** (0.193)	1.133** (0.223)
Strong Neighbor	0.196 (0.103)	0.0575 (0.109)	0.00718 (0.121)	0.406** (0.154)	-0.0320 (0.116)	0.255* (0.102)	-0.0587 (0.113)
Valuable	0.222* (0.103)	0.0738 (0.110)	-0.233 (0.122)	0.00153 (0.153)	-0.0371 (0.116)	0.0522 (0.102)	0.00288 (0.113)
Age	0.000688 (0.00417)	-0.0253** (0.00441)	0.0135** (0.00493)	0.0228** (0.00613)	0.00547 (0.00459)	-0.0261** (0.00412)	-0.0269** (0.00457)
Male	0.525** (0.120)	0.655** (0.129)	-0.281* (0.139)	-0.113 (0.173)	-0.0663 (0.135)	0.366** (0.118)	0.797** (0.135)
College Degree	-0.0536 (0.115)	-0.0838 (0.123)	0.142 (0.136)	0.0756 (0.172)	0.112 (0.129)	-0.0799 (0.114)	-0.351** (0.127)
Full-time Job	0.0241 (0.126)	-0.0720 (0.132)	-0.264 (0.148)	-0.0153 (0.179)	0.0431 (0.139)	0.0968 (0.123)	0.241 (0.136)
Part-time Job	-0.0387 (0.164)	-0.0894 (0.182)	-0.198 (0.195)	0.464 (0.274)	0.0194 (0.185)	0.131 (0.161)	-0.219 (0.195)
Income	0.00910 (0.0405)	0.0283 (0.0427)	0.0789 (0.0474)	0.0676 (0.0585)	-0.0595 (0.0455)	0.0438 (0.0395)	-0.0237 (0.0447)
Social Status	-0.0683* (0.0343)	-0.123** (0.0355)	-0.0220 (0.0392)	-0.108* (0.0494)	0.0715 (0.0375)	-0.0765* (0.0331)	-0.0522 (0.0363)
International Affairs	0.233** (0.0838)	0.131 (0.0867)	0.0508 (0.0932)	0.228 (0.117)	-0.00221 (0.0935)	0.175* (0.0826)	0.229* (0.0920)
National Defense	0.500** (0.110)	0.466** (0.115)	-0.376** (0.127)	-0.116 (0.161)	-0.488** (0.125)	0.576** (0.108)	0.650** (0.117)
LDP	0.0981 (0.151)	0.248 (0.157)	-0.351* (0.178)	0.422 (0.220)	-0.304 (0.169)	0.526** (0.147)	0.222 (0.158)
No Political Party	-0.0144 (0.129)	0.0478 (0.140)	-0.305 (0.157)	0.336 (0.186)	-0.306* (0.142)	0.0369 (0.127)	-0.146 (0.146)
Conservatism	0.0650* (0.0280)	0.0700* (0.0295)	-0.0371 (0.0328)	-0.0305 (0.0411)	-0.0782* (0.0311)	0.0737** (0.0273)	0.0949** (0.0300)
Constant	-2.442** (0.386)	-1.140** (0.399)	1.384** (0.435)	-0.206 (0.546)	0.153 (0.431)	-0.966* (0.380)	-1.952** (0.416)
Observations	1,760	1,809	1,842	1,963	1,694	1,859	1,920
Pseudo R-squared	0.0999	0.0963	0.168	0.0619	0.194	0.120	0.132
LR χ^2	241.9	213.3	340.2	80.53	435.7	307	291.8
Prob $<\chi^2$	0	0	0	6.93e-10	0	0	0

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$.

F. Table 1 Using the Geographical Proximity Control

Table 5: Support for Policy Positions Regarding the Disputed Territory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.891**	0.899**	-1.732**	-0.0445	-1.620**	0.747**	0.773**
	-0.145	-0.143	-0.144	-0.214	-0.193	-0.142	-0.143
Historically Japanese	0.403**	0.209	-0.388**	0.386*	-0.760**	0.0946	-0.116
	-0.127	-0.134	-0.146	-0.193	-0.134	-0.125	-0.139
Historically Foreign	-0.352**	-0.206	-0.0521	0.0963	-0.332*	-0.400**	-0.233
	-0.128	-0.137	-0.149	-0.181	-0.129	-0.125	-0.14
Nationalism	1.131**	0.882**	0.161	0.772**	-0.284	1.140**	1.132**
	-0.2	-0.214	-0.219	-0.264	-0.197	-0.193	-0.224
Strong Neighbor	0.194	0.0591	0.00398	0.394**	-0.0466	0.243*	-0.0599
	-0.103	-0.11	-0.119	-0.153	-0.107	-0.101	-0.113
Valuable	0.233*	0.0718	-0.208	0.0213	-0.0474	0.0534	0.00989
	-0.104	-0.11	-0.119	-0.152	-0.108	-0.101	-0.114
Age	-9.85E-05	-0.0263**	0.0155**	0.0239**	0.00836	-0.0272**	-0.0276**
	-0.00417	-0.00441	-0.00478	-0.00608	-0.00428	-0.0041	-0.00456
Male	0.493**	0.634**	-0.237	-0.115	0.0207	0.339**	0.768**
	-0.12	-0.129	-0.137	-0.172	-0.124	-0.117	-0.135
College Degree	-0.0674	-0.1	0.189	0.114	0.223	-0.107	-0.370**
	-0.115	-0.123	-0.133	-0.171	-0.119	-0.113	-0.127
Full-time Job	0.00472	-0.0987	-0.213	-0.0107	0.0579	0.0858	0.237
	-0.126	-0.132	-0.145	-0.177	-0.13	-0.123	-0.137
Part-time Job	-0.0935	-0.124	-0.0954	0.476	0.119	0.0933	-0.254
	-0.165	-0.182	-0.19	-0.273	-0.172	-0.161	-0.195
Income	0.0171	0.0357	0.0737	0.0533	-0.0615	0.0433	-0.0308
	-0.0408	-0.0428	-0.0464	-0.0583	-0.0423	-0.0394	-0.0447
Social Status	-0.0775*	-0.125**	-0.00145	-0.0818	0.0994**	-0.0836*	-0.0532
	-0.0343	-0.0356	-0.0384	-0.0488	-0.0349	-0.033	-0.0364
International Affairs	0.178*	0.0709	0.200*	0.250*	0.112	0.128	0.173
	-0.0842	-0.0876	-0.0922	-0.117	-0.0866	-0.0824	-0.0924
National Defense	0.481**	0.438**	-0.367**	-0.18	-0.495**	0.571**	0.642**
	-0.11	-0.115	-0.124	-0.162	-0.116	-0.108	-0.117
LDP	0.128	0.279	-0.392*	0.363	-0.365*	0.563**	0.252
	-0.151	-0.158	-0.175	-0.218	-0.157	-0.146	-0.158
No Political Party	-0.0165	0.055	-0.249	0.316	-0.255	0.037	-0.15
	-0.129	-0.141	-0.154	-0.185	-0.132	-0.127	-0.146
Conservatism	0.0668*	0.0705*	-0.0536	-0.0395	-0.0853**	0.0754**	0.0967**
	-0.0281	-0.0295	-0.0322	-0.0409	-0.0289	-0.0273	-0.0301
Distance	-0.396*	-0.372	-0.154	0.487	0.0456	-0.014	-0.06
	-0.193	-0.203	-0.218	-0.282	-0.199	-0.188	-0.208
Constant	-2.124**	-0.827*	1.023*	-0.582	-0.119	-0.850*	-1.795**
	-0.401	-0.416	-0.445	-0.569	-0.418	-0.394	-0.434
Observations	1,760	1,809	1,842	1,963	1,694	1,859	1,920
Pseudo R-squared	0.104	0.0982	0.118	0.0472	0.0982	0.115	0.132
LR χ^2	250.7	217.5	239.5	61.37	220.3	295.7	292.2
Prob < χ^2	0	0	0	2.34E-06	0	0	0

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$.

G. Policy Preferences for Respondents with No Real Dispute in Mind

Table 6: Support for Policy Positions Regarding the Disputed Territory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.743** (0.227)	1.071** (0.229)	-1.710** (0.237)	0.409 (0.351)	-1.254** (0.263)	0.846** (0.224)	0.656** (0.229)
Historically Japanese	0.292 (0.201)	0.109 (0.214)	-0.574* (0.227)	0.0904 (0.265)	-0.713** (0.201)	0.0361 (0.196)	0.0471 (0.219)
Historically Foreign	-0.0739 (0.191)	-0.0333 (0.201)	-0.215 (0.220)	0.244 (0.257)	-0.549** (0.189)	-0.413* (0.183)	0.000986 (0.210)
Nationalism	1.077** (0.301)	0.357 (0.316)	0.224 (0.323)	0.902* (0.361)	0.0530 (0.285)	0.793** (0.285)	1.107** (0.328)
Strong Neighbor	0.123 (0.159)	0.0202 (0.169)	0.271 (0.181)	0.332 (0.215)	0.0155 (0.159)	0.303* (0.154)	-0.113 (0.173)
Valuable	0.127 (0.159)	-0.248 (0.171)	-0.301 (0.182)	0.0377 (0.214)	0.0907 (0.160)	-0.0964 (0.155)	-0.239 (0.174)
Age	0.00669 (0.00635)	-0.0145* (0.00661)	0.0142* (0.00716)	0.0184* (0.00866)	0.00494 (0.00622)	-0.0259** (0.00615)	-0.0226** (0.00687)
Male	0.590** (0.184)	0.481* (0.195)	-0.304 (0.206)	-0.247 (0.243)	0.0413 (0.184)	0.475** (0.178)	0.958** (0.207)
College Degree	-0.0893 (0.180)	0.0360 (0.193)	0.144 (0.200)	-0.0364 (0.251)	-0.0713 (0.181)	-0.188 (0.174)	-0.463* (0.196)
Full-time Job	0.215 (0.189)	-0.0819 (0.199)	-0.0831 (0.214)	-0.196 (0.247)	-0.0787 (0.186)	0.0886 (0.182)	0.255 (0.205)
Part-time Job	0.0198 (0.260)	-0.0213 (0.283)	-0.112 (0.290)	0.200 (0.387)	0.0232 (0.262)	0.317 (0.251)	-0.154 (0.298)
Income	-0.0425 (0.0624)	-0.00975 (0.0656)	0.0479 (0.0700)	0.0610 (0.0816)	-0.0312 (0.0619)	0.0482 (0.0596)	-0.0156 (0.0671)
Social Status	-0.0184 (0.0505)	-0.0722 (0.0532)	0.0237 (0.0567)	-0.0462 (0.0653)	0.0930 (0.0507)	-0.0830 (0.0492)	0.00158 (0.0538)
International Affairs	0.190 (0.126)	0.0960 (0.131)	0.245 (0.137)	0.0949 (0.158)	0.0848 (0.127)	0.106 (0.121)	-0.0325 (0.136)
National Defense	0.570** (0.168)	0.300 (0.176)	-0.253 (0.188)	-0.321 (0.226)	-0.342* (0.172)	0.655** (0.163)	0.838** (0.178)
LDP	0.0583 (0.229)	0.517* (0.239)	-0.846** (0.269)	0.386 (0.312)	-0.669** (0.232)	0.634** (0.224)	0.323 (0.240)
No Political Party	0.0651 (0.202)	-0.0554 (0.221)	-0.455 (0.245)	0.183 (0.258)	-0.699** (0.202)	0.259 (0.199)	0.0289 (0.226)
Conservatism	0.0729 (0.0407)	0.0417 (0.0429)	-0.0591 (0.0467)	0.000522 (0.0541)	-0.0663 (0.0412)	0.0661 (0.0395)	0.104* (0.0439)
Constant	-3.122** (0.594)	-1.284* (0.605)	1.035 (0.640)	0.210 (0.774)	0.340 (0.596)	-0.870 (0.564)	-2.056** (0.617)
Observations	765	803	823	868	738	817	853
Pseudo R-squared	0.0915	0.0773	0.113	0.0422	0.0773	0.109	0.129
LR χ^2	94.25	72.75	101.4	27.18	77.58	122.3	123.9
Prob $<\chi^2$	0	1.54e-08	0	0.0757	2.26e-09	0	0

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$.

H. Policy Preferences for Respondents with Real Dispute Resolution in Mind

Table 7: Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute with China

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.0648 (0.330)	0.121 (0.366)	-1.656** (0.374)	-0.289 (0.526)	-1.642** (0.481)	0.490 (0.349)	0.660 (0.346)
Historically Japanese	0.195 (0.294)	0.305 (0.321)	-0.863* (0.371)	0.231 (0.543)	-0.833* (0.339)	0.416 (0.296)	0.00758 (0.341)
Historically Foreign	-0.792* (0.318)	-0.544 (0.359)	-0.198 (0.395)	-0.156 (0.527)	0.0851 (0.332)	-0.365 (0.304)	-0.411 (0.365)
Nationalism	1.552** (0.508)	1.090 (0.585)	0.356 (0.588)	0.150 (0.844)	-0.488 (0.528)	0.745 (0.483)	0.127 (0.567)
Age	-0.0158 (0.0106)	-0.0316** (0.0116)	0.0281* (0.0126)	0.0461** (0.0167)	0.0201 (0.0116)	-0.0232* (0.0104)	-0.0246* (0.0119)
Male	0.315 (0.293)	0.186 (0.324)	-0.514 (0.363)	0.137 (0.502)	-0.548 (0.318)	0.197 (0.281)	0.287 (0.343)
College Degree	-0.339 (0.274)	-0.411 (0.313)	0.581 (0.335)	0.376 (0.467)	0.513 (0.302)	-0.420 (0.274)	-0.364 (0.323)
Full-time Job	-0.00308 (0.322)	0.156 (0.352)	0.0303 (0.393)	0.397 (0.534)	0.663 (0.354)	0.201 (0.318)	0.517 (0.382)
Part-time Job	0.0484 (0.381)	0.110 (0.432)	0.349 (0.510)	1.067 (0.835)	0.554 (0.427)	-0.0679 (0.386)	-0.299 (0.523)
Income	0.101 (0.0998)	0.148 (0.110)	0.142 (0.119)	-0.0841 (0.171)	0.00391 (0.111)	0.0864 (0.0981)	0.0629 (0.117)
Social Status	-0.136 (0.0887)	-0.174 (0.0960)	0.0540 (0.105)	0.0378 (0.147)	-0.0375 (0.0961)	-0.0356 (0.0849)	-0.105 (0.0987)
International Affairs	0.231 (0.210)	0.0151 (0.233)	0.0278 (0.250)	-0.212 (0.359)	0.355 (0.230)	-0.0638 (0.208)	0.548* (0.250)
National Defense	0.399 (0.260)	0.526 (0.288)	-0.281 (0.322)	0.0377 (0.460)	-0.690* (0.296)	0.0772 (0.261)	0.180 (0.300)
LDP	0.464 (0.366)	0.234 (0.384)	0.186 (0.424)	0.243 (0.575)	-0.0665 (0.399)	0.661 (0.349)	0.458 (0.386)
No Political Party	0.141 (0.291)	-0.000286 (0.333)	-0.0867 (0.354)	0.649 (0.516)	-0.348 (0.314)	-0.0915 (0.282)	-0.576 (0.357)
Conservatism	0.0506 (0.0687)	0.120 (0.0755)	-0.0458 (0.0825)	-0.0125 (0.113)	-0.0711 (0.0711)	0.161* (0.0667)	0.119 (0.0779)
Constant	-1.300 (0.973)	-0.621 (1.084)	-0.155 (1.140)	0.142 (1.707)	-1.367 (1.107)	-0.368 (1.005)	-2.418* (1.145)
Observations	325	316	329	347	301	332	341
Pseudo R-squared	0.0998	0.106	0.153	0.0731	0.139	0.110	0.134
LR χ^2	44.58	40.55	53.70	13.50	54.58	50.65	49.64
Prob $<\chi^2$	0.000161	0.000648	5.80e-06	0.636	4.16e-06	1.81e-05	2.61e-05

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$.

Table 8: Northern territories/Kurile Islands Dispute with Russia

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	2.886** (0.790)	1.965* (0.881)	-2.131** (0.793)	1.601 (1.610)	-0.922 (0.768)	-0.190 (0.715)	-0.256 (0.906)
Historically Japanese	-0.0272 (0.520)	0.167 (0.567)	0.0172 (0.698)	2.946* (1.361)	-1.419** (0.529)	-0.592 (0.485)	0.187 (0.574)
Historically Foreign	-0.00235 (0.506)	-0.853 (0.603)	0.163 (0.703)	0.518 (0.950)	-0.178 (0.505)	-0.259 (0.471)	0.0250 (0.572)
Nationalism	2.318** (0.850)	1.017 (1.011)	1.790 (1.098)	1.519 (1.485)	-0.0738 (0.762)	1.494 (0.763)	1.987* (0.947)
Age	0.00279 (0.0172)	-0.0418 (0.0214)	0.0213 (0.0228)	0.121* (0.0478)	-0.0228 (0.0176)	-0.0372* (0.0165)	-0.0618** (0.0194)
Male	1.080* (0.475)	1.799** (0.623)	0.660 (0.608)	0.211 (0.955)	0.573 (0.473)	0.601 (0.435)	0.983 (0.530)
College Degree	0.668 (0.463)	1.321* (0.561)	0.488 (0.626)	0.635 (1.007)	1.196** (0.448)	-0.471 (0.443)	-0.458 (0.495)
Full-time Job	-0.657 (0.527)	-0.276 (0.620)	-0.289 (0.695)	-2.180* (1.095)	0.00393 (0.504)	-0.259 (0.469)	-0.204 (0.537)
Part-time Job	-0.649 (0.697)	-0.272 (0.911)	-0.738 (0.886)	-1.496 (1.450)	-0.321 (0.642)	-0.205 (0.622)	0.223 (0.718)
Income	0.308 (0.167)	-0.0280 (0.200)	-0.279 (0.225)	-0.0263 (0.348)	-0.0880 (0.167)	-0.00491 (0.159)	-0.168 (0.195)
Social Status	-0.114 (0.142)	-0.295 (0.168)	-0.0487 (0.199)	0.320 (0.287)	0.138 (0.138)	-0.169 (0.130)	0.0190 (0.152)
International Affairs	0.423 (0.354)	0.0500 (0.372)	-0.277 (0.455)	1.334* (0.598)	0.00676 (0.338)	0.822* (0.342)	0.830* (0.380)
National Defense	0.822 (0.455)	0.541 (0.542)	0.261 (0.614)	0.329 (1.015)	-1.038* (0.467)	0.127 (0.435)	0.0593 (0.503)
LDP	-0.636 (0.615)	-0.161 (0.737)	-0.573 (0.875)	0.758 (0.972)	-0.367 (0.659)	0.916 (0.595)	-0.0574 (0.716)
No Political Party	0.135 (0.520)	0.0836 (0.634)	0.421 (0.769)	3.207** (1.203)	0.298 (0.555)	0.102 (0.507)	0.349 (0.623)
Conservatism	0.225 (0.127)	0.276 (0.152)	-0.157 (0.188)	0.105 (0.247)	0.00421 (0.130)	-0.0186 (0.114)	0.144 (0.138)
Constant	-5.831** (1.741)	-2.016 (1.807)	2.274 (2.062)	-10.83** (3.323)	0.533 (1.537)	-1.191 (1.460)	-3.098 (1.658)
Observations	146	140	145	162	137	151	158
Pseudo R-squared	0.213	0.224	0.169	0.449	0.182	0.134	0.163
LR χ^2	42.74	34.77	20.81	44.92	34.27	26.88	26.89
Prob< χ^2	0.000306	0.00428	0.186	0.000143	0.00500	0.0429	0.0427

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$.

Table 9: Takeshima/Dokdo Islands Dispute with South Korea

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.523 (0.675)	1.996** (0.773)	-3.116** (1.137)	-7.383 (6.147)	-3.748** (1.244)	1.378* (0.628)	1.211 (0.632)
Historically Japanese	1.958** (0.717)	0.992 (0.825)	-2.325 (1.463)	-2.331 (2.802)	-0.918 (0.830)	0.426 (0.671)	-0.478 (0.750)
Historically Foreign	-0.113 (0.674)	-1.949* (0.936)	-2.119 (1.520)	-2.182 (2.322)	-1.034 (0.805)	-0.660 (0.735)	-0.607 (0.791)
Nationalism	0.706 (1.176)	3.852* (1.717)	1.177 (1.882)	7.735 (5.314)	-1.056 (1.147)	1.553 (1.102)	1.146 (1.241)
Age	0.00790 (0.0224)	-0.110** (0.0354)	0.118** (0.0437)	-0.107 (0.0852)	0.0818* (0.0318)	-0.0564* (0.0238)	-0.0495 (0.0273)
Male	-0.227 (0.572)	1.303 (0.899)	0.378 (1.108)	4.089 (3.137)	-0.501 (0.683)	0.810 (0.653)	0.620 (0.663)
College Degree	0.593 (0.570)	0.000306 (0.701)	1.340 (0.954)	-5.983 (5.280)	0.0330 (0.644)	0.198 (0.566)	-0.987 (0.690)
Full-time Job	-0.186 (0.653)	-0.690 (0.888)	-1.638 (1.286)	4.583 (5.489)	-0.309 (0.733)	0.0641 (0.656)	1.198 (0.716)
Part-time Job	-1.094 (0.795)	-2.348 (1.207)	-0.480 (1.445)	0.200 (2.992)	-0.499 (0.911)	-0.889 (0.858)	-0.383 (1.077)
Income	0.0331 (0.190)	0.130 (0.233)	-0.348 (0.352)	-0.655 (0.651)	-0.368 (0.236)	-0.120 (0.201)	0.00815 (0.215)
Social Status	-0.258 (0.178)	-0.622* (0.261)	-0.554 (0.416)	-1.677 (1.832)	0.306 (0.211)	-0.119 (0.171)	-0.107 (0.190)
International Affairs	-0.211 (0.493)	1.171 (0.602)	-1.262 (0.798)	-0.230 (1.651)	-0.425 (0.571)	0.439 (0.466)	-0.0987 (0.495)
National Defense	0.369 (0.632)	0.708 (0.747)	-0.795 (0.996)	4.009 (3.888)	1.024 (0.767)	0.413 (0.612)	1.690* (0.674)
LDP	-1.030 (0.814)	-0.473 (0.854)	-3.738* (1.610)	5.188 (3.603)	-1.291 (1.009)	0.476 (0.718)	-0.0554 (0.772)
No Political Party	-0.478 (0.673)	1.231 (0.923)	-3.197 (1.721)	7.394 (5.429)	-0.0343 (0.783)	0.683 (0.731)	0.479 (0.745)
Conservatism	0.445** (0.167)	0.432* (0.200)	-0.638* (0.268)	-1.918 (1.573)	-0.181 (0.180)	0.0824 (0.149)	0.0717 (0.153)
Constant	-1.736 (2.130)	-2.429 (2.415)	12.94** (4.777)	29.00 (25.25)	-0.273 (2.475)	-0.825 (1.921)	-0.140 (2.137)
Observations	93	100	105	106	87	96	104
Pseudo R-squared	0.235	0.451	0.575	0.497	0.358	0.252	0.286
LR χ^2	30.26	58.34	62	25.63	40.96	32.87	35.22
Prob< χ^2	0.0167	9.96e-07	2.40e-07	0.0594	0.000564	0.00768	0.00370

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$.