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Political Research Quarterly 2010 63: 188 originally published online 15 May 2009
DOI: 10.1177/1065912908327528

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Outside Options and Burden Sharing in Nonbinding Alliances

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The authors develop a model of alliances with outside options to study burden sharing in nonbinding alliance agreements. The analysis provides an explanation for the variation in ally contributions to NATO over time and why the post–Cold War period has seen an increase in the use of coalitions of the willing. Additionally, the analysis reveals something of an initiator’s disadvantage in burden sharing—the initiator of an alliance action pays a disproportionate cost of the military burden. The authors’ argument provides an alternative explanation for why the United States has been consistently the largest contributor to NATO.

Keywords: alliances; political economy

In 1981, the U.S. Congress included in its annual Defense Authorization Act a call for U.S. allies to increase their contribution to the common defense. Since then, the secretary of defense has provided an annual report that describes disparities between the United States and ally contributions to various joint security endeavors and proposes policies aimed at eliminating inequalities. Such concerns about burden sharing have never gone away from American foreign policy debate and are reflected in voluminous scholarly work on alliances.

The starting point for much of the literature on the economics of alliances is Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966) *An Economic Theory of Alliances*. Olson and Zeckhauser argue that to understand alliance behavior, we must begin with a recognition of its purpose. Alliances coordinate offensive policies, such as wars or peacekeeping, or encourage collaboration to protect the members from aggression by a common enemy. Olson and Zeckhauser suggest that the common interest, which defines the alliance relationship, imbues such an agreement with the characteristics of a collective good. Note that Olson and Zeckhauser’s collective good is similar to but not the same as a public good. Collective goods are closely related to club goods. That is, goods that are nonrival but excludable for nonclub or nonalliance members. For consistency, however, we use the *collective good* rather than *club good* terminology. Applying the logic of collective goods to alliances, Olson and Zeckhauser find that the level of contribution of any member depends on its relative size. That is, larger and richer members tend to contribute more to joint pursuits, while smaller and poorer members contribute less, thus creating disproportionate defense burdens.

The economic theory of alliances, however, leaves unexplained three empirical puzzles. First, while the theory explains some alliance behavior, such as NATO burden sharing in the 1950s and 1960s, it does not explain well the distribution of military burdens in pre–Cold War alliances, such as the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente just prior to World War I. In these cases, the wealthier Great Britain and Germany contributed less than the poorer Austria-Hungary and Russia. The Anglo-French Treaty is a similar counterexample from the interwar period. This alliance was based on a mutual recognition by Great Britain and France that their fates were closely connected to defending the Rhine, but throughout most of the interwar years, the French bore most of the burden.

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Authors’ Note: We thank Kevin Clarke, Nevzat I. Eren, Mark Fey, Hein Goemans, Clifton Morgan, David Primo, Thomas Ramsay, Curtis Signorino, Branislav Slantchev, and Alexander Vostroknutov for their comments and advice. We would also like to thank the editor of Political Research Quarterly and three anonymous reviewers. Kris Ramsay acknowledges financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SES-0413381. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
defending it. Second, the economic theory of alliances struggles to explain the change in non-U.S. NATO spending in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, U.S. NATO spending went down with détente, but non-U.S. NATO spending increased. By 1980, the old pattern of higher U.S. burdens was reestablished. Finally, in the post–Cold War era, there has been another disproportionate change in burden sharing within NATO, with European countries decreasing defense spending and contributions to NATO activities in larger proportions than the United States.

These puzzles have led to a significant literature that generalizes and extends Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966) basic economic theory of alliances. Most notably, Sandler and his coauthors have developed a series of joint production models that generalize the economic theory of alliances to circumstances where the alliance actions produce less than pure collective goods (Conybeare and Sandler 1990; Murdoch and Sandler 1982, 1984; Sandler 1977; Sandler and Hartley 1995, 1999, 2001). Conybeare (1994) extends the economic model in a different direction, treating alliances as producers of an impure collective good called defense, and asks what the portfolio benefits of alliances are in terms of military returns and the lowering of risk. Departing even further from the collective good model of alliance, Morrow (1994, 2000) and Smith (1995) have investigated and explained other dimensions of alliance behavior, such as the signaling value of alliance formation and the varying degrees of reliability of defensive alliance agreements.

In this article, we study burden sharing in alliances by relaxing an important assumption in the economic theory of alliances, that alliance agreements are binding contracts. Specifically, the existing literature implicitly assumes that allies do not have outside options and must pursue foreign policy objectives within existing alliance structures. We find this assumption to be difficult to maintain. Recent history reminds us that “coalitions of the willing” are still viable alternatives to established alliances for countries to pursue joint foreign policy goals. An alliance agreement, like any agreement between sovereigns, is binding only to the extent those involved choose to work within it. Therefore, in our model, we allow the policy initiator to have the option of undertaking a costly search for an ad hoc partner. With this modeling choice, we analyze a previously unstudied aspect of the bargaining process within alliances: the two-front bargaining problem faced by the initiator, where on one side there are existing allies and on the other there are potential new partners. Although few have analyzed the effects of outside options in contexts other than war (an exception being Voeten 2001), the economic literature on the subject is extensive (Binmore 1985; Lee 1994; Muthoo 1995, 1999; Shaked 1994). The question then becomes: How does the option of searching for an ad hoc partner affect the existing ally’s incentive to contribute to the joint foreign policy action?

By considering the possibility of pursuing an outside option, we gain insight into several empirical puzzles that can not be explained by the economic theory of alliances. First, it allows us to consider how the structure of the international system might influence burden sharing among allies. Our analysis predicts an unusual relationship between ally contributions and the flexibility of alliance configurations. Specifically, allies contribute more in loose bipolar conditions than in tight bipolar conditions, but do not contribute enough in the multipolar setting to deter search. As such, a theory of alliances that incorporates the possibility of ad hoc coalitions provides an alternative explanation for the variance in contributions of allies, to NATO, for example, over time, as well as why the post–Cold War period has seen a broad decrease in contributions to alliances and an increase in the use of coalitions of the willing. The result suggests that the breakdown of NATO relations in 2003 might be caused as much by strategic (structural) changes in the international system as by inept management of the alliance by political leaders in the United States.

Second, our analysis reveals something of an initiator’s disadvantage in burden sharing—the initiator of a foreign policy action in an alliance pays a disproportionate cost of the military burden. This departs from the conventional view that links country size and wealth to burden sharing and proposes an alternative explanation for why the United States has been consistently the largest contributor to NATO. If we consider only the Cold War actions of NATO, the country size proposition and the initiator disadvantage are observationally equivalent for the United States. If, however, we look at historical alliances, or alliances in the post–Cold War period, we see that the more consistent regularity is that initiators of multilateral security actions shoulder the largest burden.

A Model of Burden Sharing with Search

We model the alliance bargaining process as one between an initiator and an ally over the amount of resources that the ally contributes to a joint foreign
policy action that produces a collective good. Lee (1994) develops a model that studies the role of searching for outside options in bargaining between a buyer and a seller over the price of an indivisible good. Our model differs in that it looks at situations in which a collective good is to be produced for a known cost, but where the good can be produced by different combinations of countries.\(^5\) Call the country initiating the foreign policy act “country 1” and the ally “country 2.” Consider the simple world where the countries in the alliance have the same policy preference and receive equal benefit from the proposed foreign policy act. We abstract away from differences in policy preferences to investigate the strategic effects of outside options on alliance behavior. Clearly, this is not the whole story, but our model is sufficient to explain many apparent anomalies in previous theories.\(^4\) For some fee, \(\phi\), the allies can take an action that provides each member of the partnership a benefit \(b\). Normalize the benefit such that if the collective good is produced, and a country is a member of the coalition, then each country gets a payoff of 1, but gets 0 otherwise. Also assume \(\phi \in (1, 3/2)\), such that no state wants to produce the good on its own, but if two countries contribute to its production, both are better off. The logic that drives the equilibrium strategies is the same for all \(\phi \in (1, 2)\), which is the feasible range for the cost of producing the collective good; however, \(\phi \in (1, 3/2)\) is the harder case to solve than the case where \(\phi \in (3/2, 2)\).\(^5\) The model thus focuses on the basic strategic trade-off faced by members of an alliance: on one hand, both countries have a common interest in producing the policy outcome, modeled here as a unit payoff; on the other hand, both allies desire to free ride on the contribution of their alliance partner in order to maximize their individual gain from the alliance’s action.

The alliance bargaining problem we consider consists of two periods. The game begins when country 1 proposes a joint foreign policy action. In response, country 2 informs country 1 how much it is willing to contribute. Let \(r_1 \in [0, 1]\) be country 2’s proposed contribution, which country 1 could subtract from the fee for taking the proposed action. Given \(r_1\), country 1 can decide whether or not to go forward with its proposal. If the policy action is taken with the ally, country 2 gets \(1 - r_1\), and country 1 gets \(1 - \phi + r_1\). Obviously, country 1 produces the good only if \(1 - \phi + r_1 \geq 0\). As an alternative to accepting the proposed contribution from country 2, country 1 may choose either to search for contributions from potential partners outside the alliance or to advance the game to the second period and ask country 2 to make a second offer. If country 1 decides to search in the first period, it pays a cost \(c \in (0, 1/2]\) and then calls for a contribution from a state outside the alliance. If \(c > 1/2\), then the search will be an irrelevant option, since it is too costly.\(^6\) For more details, see the proofs in the appendix.

Now consider the search process. For simplicity, we assume that the contribution offered by the potential ad hoc ally, denoted as \(x_1\), is unknown ex ante and drawn from a uniform distribution on \([0, 1]\). If the ad hoc partner is strategic and fully informed, then it does not offer any more (or less) of a contribution than the ally. Here we model a world where the ad hoc partner is uncertain about the cost of action. For example, the third party might have less or noisier information than the alliance members or might not know enough about intra-alliance negotiations to learn country 2’s proposal. In such a world, an ad hoc partner makes an offer that appears to be a random variable.\(^7\) Furthermore, we assume that the outside offer \(x_1\) is a standing offer and can be accepted in period 1 or 2. This assumption allows us to consider an important dynamic: If the outside offer can be taken in either period, the alliance partner has an opportunity to react to developments, that is, it can condition its second-period offer on the initial outside option. After a search, country 1 decides whether to accept \(r_1\) or \(x_1\). If it accepts either offer in the first period, then the game ends and payoffs are realized. Otherwise, country 1 moves the game to the second period by calling on country 2 to make a second proposal.

The second period is played in a similar fashion with country 2 making a new offer, \(r_2 \in [0, 1]\). Given \(r_2\), country 1 can choose not to proceed with the proposed policy, to proceed with the alliance partner at a fee \(\phi - r_2\), or to proceed with the ad hoc partner at a fee \(\phi - x_1\), all of which will end the game. If country 1 does not search in the first period, then without loss of generality, we can set \(x_1 = 0.5\). Alternatively, country 1 can search again and draw a second outside offer, \(x_2\), at a cost \(c\). After observing \(r_2, x_1\), and \(x_2\), country 1 must choose whether or not to produce the collective good, and with whom to produce it. The sequence of the game is also depicted in Figure 1.

Countries in this dynamic game are assumed to discount future payoffs with a common discount factor \(\delta \in (0, 1]\). That is, delay may be costly. Country 1’s utility is \(\delta^{-1}(1 - \phi + x_1)\) when it takes the joint policy action, where \(x_1\) is either the ally’s contribution in period 1 or an outside offer available. If there was search, then the search costs are subtracted from this
Country 2’s utility is $\delta t - r_t (1 - rt)$ if $rt$ is accepted in period $t$ and zero if it is rejected by country 1.

Before proceeding to the equilibrium analysis, some discussion of the search cost is in order. Note that any search for an ad hoc partner is costly, regardless of the given country’s alliance membership. The question then becomes: What aspects of an alliance are captured by country 1’s search cost? First, the cost reflects a decrease in political capital that countries have invested in an alliance relationship. This loss in political capital may come from domestic audience costs (Fearon 1994) that arise from violating a previous commitment, or audience costs in the ally’s country that discourage its leaders from working with the offending ally in the future. As was clearly the case in the run-up to the second Gulf War, statements by the Bush administration that it was willing to act outside NATO and the Security Council were damaging to relations between the United States and fellow NATO allies, making future cooperation for joint gains more difficult. Second, there exist incentives for other countries to counterbalance a new alliance. That is, after a new alliance is formed, countries on the outside of the coalition may form alliances of their own. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Bruce (1990). If the creation of alliances leads nonmembers to respond in kind, then the creation of alliances induces rigidity into the international system. So, much as the formation of NATO led to the formation of the Warsaw Pact and the Triple Alliance energized the Triple Entente, building alliances can make it more difficult to find an ad hoc partner. This leads to our final, and larger, point that there is an intuitive connection between the search cost and the configuration of the international system. In what international relations theory calls a tight bipolar system, where there are two competing blocs of countries and an intense competition between them over strategic resources, we would expect search costs to be high. Under these circumstances, there would be few unaligned countries and a potentially high cost of abandoning established allies. In what is called a loose bipolar system, with less intense competition between blocs and some small number of unaligned countries, we would expect the search cost to be lower. Last, in a multipolar system, characterized by a large number of unaligned or weakly aligned countries, we would expect the search cost to be lower still.

**Equilibrium Analysis**

We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game using backward induction. All proofs are found in the appendix. We first examine the allies’ second-period equilibrium strategies conditional on what happened in the first period, and then analyze their first-period strategies. The analysis results in two lemmas that characterize countries’ equilibrium strategies in each of the two periods. The lemmas are the building blocks for the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium for the entire game and highlight some of the strategic incentives that arise when allies bargain in the shadow of outside options.

Our first result says if country 1 searched in the first period and received an outside offer, country 2 always matches the outside offer in the second period to keep itself in the running as a partner for the production of the collective good.

**Lemma 1:** If period 2 is reached in an equilibrium and country 1 searched in the first period, then country 2 offers enough to be in the running for the production of the good in the second period. That is, \( r_2 \geq \max\{x_1, \phi - 1\} \).

The intuition behind the result is that, if country 1 searched in the first period, then it has an offer \( x_1 \) in hand, which may or may not be big enough for the production to take place. Country 1 needs to receive a contribution that is at least as big as \( \phi - 1 \) to produce the good. If \( x_1 \geq \phi - 1 \), then country 2 needs to match \( x_1 \) so that it has a chance to participate in the joint policy and receive the benefit. On the other hand, if \( x_1 < \phi - 1 \), it is in country 2’s interest to offer at least \( \phi - 1 \) so that the good will be produced within the alliance. Therefore, country 2’s offer in the second period has to be as big as both \( x_1 \) and \( \phi - 1 \).

We now fully characterize the countries’ second-period equilibrium strategies. By Lemma 1, the ally’s second offer \( r_2 \) is the only relevant offer when country 1 considers whether or not to search in the second period. Let \( r^* \in [0, 1] \) be the level of contribution by the ally that makes country 1 indifferent between searching and not searching in the second period. It is a function of the search cost \( c \). If \( r^* < \phi - 1 \), then a high search cost makes searching worse than producing the good with the existing ally. As a result, country 2 will offer exactly \( \phi - 1 \) so that the good will be produced, and country 2 takes the entire surplus. Now suppose \( r^* \geq \phi - 1 \). Then, in the second period, country 1 searches if \( r_2 < r^* \) and does not search if \( r_2 \geq r^* \). So, if country 2 contributes at least \( r^* \), then country 1 accepts the offer and country 2’s payoff is \( 1 - r_2 \); if country 2 contributes a smaller amount, then country 1 searches and the resulted payoff for country 2 is a lottery: it receives \( 1 - r_2 \) with probability \( r_2 \) (the probability that the second outside offer \( x_2 \) is no larger than \( r_2 \)) and receives 0 with probability \( 1 - r_2 \). In this scenario, at most 2’s expected utility is \( 1/4 \), which is the maximum expected value of the lottery \((1 - r_2)\ r_2 \) achieved at \( r_2 = 1/2 \). Country 2’s best response, then, depends on the values of \( r^* \), \( x_1 \), and \( 1/2 \). If \( r^* < 3/4 \), that is, \( 1 - r^* > 1/4 \), then country 2 offers \( r_2 = \max\{r^*, x_1\} \). This is a case where the most country 2 can get from inducing country 1 to search is less than what it receives from satisfying country 1 outright, but also by Lemma 1, country 1 has to offer at least \( x_1 \) to be in the running for the production of the good. If \( r^* \geq 3/4 \), that is, \( 1 - r^* \leq 1/4 \), then country 2 can be better off by inducing country 1 to search and the strategies are more involved.

Let \( r > 1/2 \) denote an offer by country 2 that leads country 1 to search but gives country 2 the same expected payoff as offering \( r^* \). That is, \( r \) is the solution to the following equality:

\[
1 - r^* = (1 - r)r^*.
\]

The relationship between \( r^* \) and \( r \) is shown in Figure 2. Because \( u_2(r_2) \) is concave in \( r_2 \), \( r \leq r^* \). The thresholds, \( r, r^* \), and \( 1/2 \), mark the regions where the outside offer \( x_1 \) may fall and to which country 2 responds differently with its optimal offer. A complete characterization of the countries’ strategies at this stage is presented in Table 1. The derivation of the equilibrium strategies in Table 1 can be found in the appendix.

![Figure 2: Country 2’s Utility in Period 2 Given Search](image-url)

Note: The double-crossed lines are of equal length, so the utility of offering \( r^* \) for country 2 is the same as the utility of offering \( r \) and inducing country 1 to search. In other words, \( 1 - r^* = (1 - r)r^* \).
was somewhat improved, but country 1 still has a strong incentive to search again, then country 2 has to match the outside offer to keep itself in the running. If the first search result was quite good and country 1 has only a mild incentive to search again, then country 2 is better off proposing enough to deter country 1 from searching to avoid the risk of being replaced by a second outside offer. If the first search went exceedingly well, then country 1 will not search for a second time, and country 2 has to match $x_1$ to receive any benefit.

Overall, a successful search by country 1 decreases country 2's incentive to free ride and increases country 2's willingness to contribute more. Note that country 1 has an incentive to reveal the ad hoc offer to its ally. Looking at Table 1, we know that if the offer were revealed, the worst that could happen to country 1 is that the outside offer is very low and country 2 offers $1/2$ in response. If the outside offer is high, revealing the offer makes country 1 better off. If country 1 never reveals the offer, country 2's belief is defined by the expected value of the outside offer, which induces country 2 to offer $1/2$. So, in revealing the outside offer, in no state of the world is country 1 worse off, and in some states of the world, it is better off.\textsuperscript{13}

The preceding analysis assumes that country 1 searched in the first period. This is the more complicated case. If it did not search in the first period, then country 1’s decision problem in the second period is similar to the above, but we need no longer consider the constraint that $r_2 \geq \max \{x_1, \phi - 1\}$. Therefore, if $r^* < 3/4$, then country 2 offers $r^*$ and country 1 accepts; if $r^* \geq 3/4$, then country 2 offers $1/2$ and country 1 searches.

The next lemma says that country 1, the initiator, never moves the game directly to the second period by asking its ally to make a second offer. Rather, country 1 always takes advantage of having the outside option in the first period if it is not initially satisfied with the ally’s offer.

**Lemma 2:** For $\delta$ sufficiently large, country 1 accepts a contribution from country 2 in the first period if it is greater than $r^*$; otherwise, it rejects an offer and searches in the first period.

Intuitively, if country 2’s first offer $r_1$ is sufficiently large, then country 1 accepts it and produces the good; otherwise, country 1 can look for a better outside offer or asks country 2 to make a second offer. Lemma 2 states that when rejecting $r_1$, country 1 searches first rather than continues bargaining with the ally. Here, $r^*$ again becomes the crucial offer that makes country 1 indifferent between accepting country 2’s first offer and rejecting it in the first period. Comparing the payoffs from searching in the first period and moving directly to the second period, it can be shown that country 1 is better off searching in the first period for any $r_1 < r^*$. The full characterization of country 1’s equilibrium strategies at this stage is presented in Table 2.

### Table 1

*Equilibrium Strategies in Period 2 after a Search in Period 1*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$r^* &lt; 3/4$</th>
<th>(or $1 - r^* &gt; 1/4$)</th>
<th>$(r^*, 1]$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x_1$ range</td>
<td>$[0, r^*]$</td>
<td>$(r^*, 1]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country 2’s offer</th>
<th>$r^*$</th>
<th>$x_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country 1’s response</td>
<td>Accept</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$r^* \geq 3/4$</th>
<th>(or $1 - r^* \leq 1/4$)</th>
<th>$(r^*, 1]$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x_1$ range</td>
<td>$[0, 1/2]$</td>
<td>$(1/2, r]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country 2’s offer</th>
<th>$1/2$</th>
<th>$x_1$</th>
<th>$r^*$</th>
<th>$x_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country 1’s response</td>
<td>Search</td>
<td>Search</td>
<td>Accept</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country 2’s offer</th>
<th>$1/2$</th>
<th>$x_1$</th>
<th>$r^*$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country 1’s response</td>
<td>Search</td>
<td>$Accept$</td>
<td>$Accept$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Burden Sharing with Varying Search Costs**

With the above equilibrium analysis, we can now discuss the unique equilibrium to this game. Proposition 1 characterizes the two cases in which the search cost for country 1 is sufficiently high so that the ally has an opportunity to offer an amount that will guarantee a joint production of the good.

**Proposition 1:** For $\delta$ sufficiently large, if $1/2(2 - \phi)^2 < c$, then country 2 offers $\phi - 1$ in the first period and country 1 accepts immediately; if
Recall that $r^*$ is the level of contribution that makes country 1 indifferent between accepting the ally’s offer and searching in the first period, and we find that $r^* = 1 - \sqrt{2c}$. So when $c = 1/32$, $r^* = 3/4$. The proposition says when $1/32 \leq c$, or when $r^* \leq 3/4$, the offer that makes country 1 indifferent between searching and not searching is relatively small. Consequently, it is in country 2’s interest to satisfy country 1 outright and jointly produce the good. Additionally, since $r^*$ is a decreasing function of $c$, as $c$ decreases within the feasible range of this case, the ally has to contribute more to satisfy country 1.

Proposition 1 offers a rather different explanation for disproportionate burden sharing in alliances than the conventional wisdom. Specifically, in our model, the initiator of an alliance action is in a weak position because its ally need only minimally satisfy the policy initiator to take part in the policy benefit. As we touched upon earlier, the prevailing view is that large, rich countries tend to shoulder a disproportionate share of the defense burden, while small countries free ride. The logic of outside options, on the other hand, suggests that initiators should shoulder more of the burden.

An examination of prominent pre–World War II alliances, such as the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente on the eve of World War I (Thies 1987; Conybeare and Sandler 1990) and NATO in the early Cold War period (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966), reveals a pattern that is consistent with our finding. Thies (1987) points to evidence provided by Taylor (1954), reproduced in Table 3, as an important anomaly for the economic theory of alliances. Taylor’s estimates of the percentage of national income devoted to arms in 1914—confirmed by similar estimates of other economic historians and reported by Thies—look very different from what may be expected from the economic theory of alliances (Thies 1987, 309). In particular, when compared to the best feasible measure of size and wealth, 1914 levels of coal and steel production, Thies (1987) notes that the wealthiest member of each alliance is contributing less on the eve of war. While it is not true for every possible value of the search cost, in our model, the initiator of an alliance act often pays a larger share—or more accurately, its net share of benefit is smaller. In fact, the rigid alliance system in the early twentieth century, and the resulting fixed military plans, would suggest search costs were high and countries such as Russia and Austria-Hungary should be spending more on arms. For a discussion of the alliance system leading up to World War I, see Joll (1992). Similarly, we should expect the United States to consistently be the largest contributor to NATO and to have spent the largest share of GDP on defense over the period from 1950 to 1989 (Olson and Zeckhauser 1992; Conybeare and Sandler 1990).

### Table 2
**Country 1’s Equilibrium Strategy in Period 1 after a Search**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range of $x_1$</th>
<th>($r^<em>, r^</em>_{el}$)</th>
<th>($r^*, 1$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country 1’s response in period 1 after search</td>
<td>Accept $r_i$ if $r_i \geq r^*$, else second period</td>
<td>Accept $r_i$ if $r_i &gt; r^*_{el}$, else second period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3
**Percentage of National Income Devoted to Arms, 1914**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Triple Alliance</th>
<th>Triple Entente</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In the table, $r^*$ is country 2’s first-period offer that gives country 1 the same payoff as offering $r^*$ in the second period. That is, $r^*$ is the solution to the equation $1 - \phi + r^* = \delta(1 - \phi + r^*)$. The derivation of the equilibrium strategy in Table 2 can be found in the appendix.
1966; Sandler and Hartley 1995). This is not simply because the United States is bigger and richer; rather, it is a result of the United States being the initiator of most NATO actions.

Furthermore, the inverse relationship between the search cost and the amount that the ally contributes in this equilibrium sheds new light on the dynamics of burden sharing during the Cold War, when the search cost was generally high. During the Cold War, burden sharing between the United States and its NATO allies shifted over time. One existing explanation for this shift, presented by Murdoch and Sandler (1984), is that as the United States moved from a policy of mutually assured destruction (i.e., offering deterrence) to flexible response (i.e., conventional and limited defense), the nature of the good provided by NATO changed from a pure public good to an impure public good. As O’Neal and Elrod (1989) have pointed out, this argument is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. In particular, Murdoch and Sandler’s (1984) argument predicts a change in burden sharing as early as 1967 and could likely be extended back to the arms race in the late 1950s. This disparity between the joint production model’s prediction and the change in burden sharing suggests something else was the cause. One weakness of the joint production model is that it is largely apolitical. That is, it focuses on how technological change shapes NATO’s defense policy while leaving political change out of the equation. Second, although the shift from a strategy of mutually assured destruction to flexible response seems to be a reasonable explanation for changes in the publicness of the common defense in 1967, the relatively minor change to a deep-strike strategy in the 1980s does not seem significant enough to explain the reemergence of disproportionality in the 1980s. There are numerous studies on the trends in military burdens over time. The general trend in military spending shows that from 1949 to 1970, there existed a strong correlation between country size and defense burden, which then decreased in the 1970s but returned in the 1980s. For more discussion, see O’Neal and Elrod (1989) and Sandler and Murdoch (2000).

Our model, on the other hand, points to an obvious change that coincides with both developments—detente and its decline. In fact, we find results similar to the informal results of Snyder (1984). That is, alliance behavior is strongly correlated with the flexibility of the international system.

To see this, recall that in 1967, the Johnson administration approached the Soviet Union on the actions of both Vietnam and arms control. As both countries’ economies were suffering from the increased cost of defense, agreement on a reduction in tensions became possible. In addition, as the split between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) grew, there was finally room for the United States to explore the possibility of coordinating policy with non-NATO actors, as seen in the Shanghai communiqué in 1972 and the February joint communiqué in 1973. So as the United States’ search costs decreased during détente, the consequence was an increase in the share of the military burden taken on by NATO allies. Notice that this comparative static exists even without the actual use of the outside option, implying that changes in search costs can have distributional consequences within an alliance without ever leading to new coalitions.

By 1980, however, the deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly following the invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, again increased the costs of searching for the United States. As a result, the smaller NATO allies began to free ride, and the defense burden, measured as the ratio of defense spending to GDP, was carried by the initiator of allied actions, which was the United States.

Moreover, as we move into the post–Cold War period, the joint production model has less to say about the pattern of burden sharing. In particular, the implicit assumption that alliance agreements are binding is problematic. If the end of the Cold War implies that countries have more options when it comes to producing security, which recent trends suggest that they do, we may wonder what happens as search costs decrease further.

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The proposition states that when the search cost is low, that is, \( c < 1/32 \), country 2 offers \( \hat{r}_1 \), and country 1 searches in the first period. The proposition states that when the search cost is low, that is, \( c \in (0, 1/32) \), or when \( r^* \) is high (i.e., \( r^* > 3/4 \)), country 2 may offer \( \hat{r}_1 \), which is less than enough to make country 1 satisfied outright. What is interesting about this equilibrium is that all sorts of outcomes are possible. Specifically, based on the equilibrium strategies characterized in Tables 1 and 2, in the cases when country 1 searches, if the outside offer is sufficiently small, that is, \( x_1 \in [0, 1/2] \), then country 1 accepts \( \hat{r}_1 \) in the first period. If, however, the outside offer is somewhat better, then country 1 moves the game to the second period and forces country 2 to match the outside offer. If the first period search goes well, then country 1 can move the game to the second period and induce its ally to offer \( r^* \), and country 1 gets a bonus from its ally’s bid-jumping incentive. Finally, the first period search could go exceedingly well, in fact, so well that country 1 decides to break with its ally and takes the joint action with the outside partner. So even in an alliance without private information, if anarchy implies that countries have outside options, then there is positive probability that alliances break down. On the other hand, the existence of outside options reduces country 2’s incentive to free ride, and its equilibrium resource contribution is greater than the minimum needed to make its ally willing to take the joint action.

Given this result, what should we expect to happen with the end of the Cold War? Because the international system went from one of rigidity and intense competition between the Soviet Union and the United States to a unipolar system, where the United States has much more flexibility in choosing the means for pursuing foreign policy goals, it seems reasonable to conclude that search costs have decreased significantly. In such a situation, we should see that NATO allies become less eager to pursue collective foreign policy goals led by the United States and that there is a greater risk that major powers take actions with ad hoc coalitions rather than with existing allies. This, in fact, occurs, with Italy’s ad hoc coalition Operation Alba in the Balkans, Australia’s various operations in the South Pacific and Timor Sea, and the United States’ operation in Iraq. One may wonder how to empirically differentiate our model of costly search from a model that simply says burden sharing will depend on the level of threat. A key difference between the threat model and ours is that the threat model would suggest that non-U.S. NATO spending should have gone down with the decreased threat in the 1970s, which did not happen. Our approach does explain both the increase in spending in the 1970s and the decreased contributions in the post–Cold War period.16

One measurable manifestation of the decreased willingness of allies to contribute to the common defense is a disproportionate decrease in spending on defense among allies. This is exactly what has happened. Between 1990 and 1998, the defense spending of non-U.S. members of NATO, as a percentage of GDP, decreased by 31.4%, and allies in the Middle East similarly have decreased their spending by 55.4% (U.S. Department of Defense 1999). The one region where there has been little change is in Asia. This may be the result of the existence of a major power with competing interests in the region, that is, the PRC.

As stated in Propositions 1 and 2, there are two possible equilibrium stories, depending on the search cost. Proposition 1 suggests that when the cost of searching for a new ally is sufficiently high, it is the existing alliance that will be activated to pursue joint foreign policy goals. On the other hand, Proposition 2 suggests that when the search cost is sufficiently low, so that \( r^* \) is sufficiently large, country 2’s offer will lead to a search. Accordingly, low search cost implies that there is a possibility that the alliance breaks down and an ad hoc coalition is formed. Figure 3 depicts country 2’s equilibrium offer in period 1 as a function of the search cost. In the figure, there are three types of equilibrium offers: in regime 1, country 2 offers \( \hat{r}_1 \); in regime 2, country 2 offers \( r^* \); and in regime 3, country 2 offers \( \phi - 1 \) and takes the entire surplus.

Why Alliances?

The analysis of the game also leads to three interesting and unexpected results. Our first comparative static shows that the monotonic relationship found in Proposition 1 between the search cost and the optimal offer \( (r^*) \) extends to the case in Proposition 2 as well.

Proposition 3: When \( c < 1/32 \) and \( \delta \) is sufficiently large, the equilibrium offer of country 2 is decreasing in country 1’s search cost.

So, as in the first proposition, we can expect small increases in the search cost to lead to smaller contributions (see Figure 3).
There is no simple pattern when it comes to the probability of forming an ad hoc coalition, however. Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the equilibrium probability of alliance breakdown is zero. Under Proposition 2, the probability of an ad hoc coalition can be decreasing or increasing. When the search cost increases, the offer made in equilibrium (\( r^1 \)) goes down, and the outside offer that leads country 1 to form an ad hoc coalition in the first period also goes down. As a result, the probability of getting an outside offer that leads to alliance breakdown increases. However, when this happens, the offer that deters country 1 from searching, \( r^* \), also decreases, and the option becomes more attractive to country 2. The probability of alliance breakdown, therefore, depends on the net effect of the two countervailing effects. Detailed characterization of this result can be found in the appendix.17

Third, our model suggests that countries may join alliances in an anarchic environment for the very reason that search is costly as a member of an alliance. Specifically, in our model, when \( c \) is sufficiently small, \textit{ex ante}, a country can prefer having a constraining alliance and paying the search cost when necessary to the situation where it may search freely. To see the logic of this argument, suppose a country can choose to form an alliance or not. Normalize the search cost without an alliance to be zero. We then ask: Is it ever the case that a country prefers to form or join an alliance and impose positive search costs on itself? The following proposition shows that the answer can be yes.

\textit{Proposition 4:} For \( \delta \) sufficiently large, being in an alliance improves the welfare of the country that pays the search cost whenever \( c < 1/8[1 – (\phi – 1)^2]^2 \).

For both types of equilibrium, even though equilibrium strategies can lead the initiating country to perform costly search, country 1 sometimes prefers to be in an alliance rather than having the freedom to search at no cost. The intuition for this result comes from the fact that the ally’s offer insures country 1 against the downside risk of a search that returns a very small outside offer.

Note, however, the existence of outside options is necessary to bring a higher payoff to country 1. Having an alliance in and of itself does not have such a welfare effect. If there were no outside options, country 2 will provide just enough resources to make country 1 indifferent between producing and not producing the collective good. In other words, without an outside option, country 1 receives a net benefit of zero when it takes a joint action, while country 2 receives the maximum net benefit. In this sense, anarchy plays a critical role in creating the incentive to form alliances by presenting outside options for the initiators. If the alliance were an enforceable contract, however, as in the economic theory of alliances, country 1 would be better off without an alliance and receive a strictly positive expected payoff from taking a joint action with an ad hoc partner. Therefore, alliances of the kind we describe are welfare-improving institutions for states in environments where agreements are not enforceable.

What if the other ally, country 2, also has an outside option? It is generally true that if country 2 has its own outside options, then its bargaining position vis-à-vis country 1 will improve and its contribution will likely decrease accordingly. The logic is in line with that behind the idea of free riding where one player has all the bargaining power and extracts all the benefits. Therefore, allowing country 2 as well as country 1 to have outside options will only reinforce our
central finding that the initiator will pay a disproportionate share of alliance spending. The one-sidedness of the outside options in the model is to investigate how the availability of outside options changes the bargaining power of the non–free riders, which has received little attention in the existing studies.

**Conclusion**

In a recent research article, the Analysis Center for Northrop Grumman considers what trends in the post–Cold War period tell us about military conflicts and strategy in the twenty-first century. One quite dramatic shift in military doctrine has been the change from a focus on collective security to one in which countries form coalitions of the willing to achieve foreign policy objectives (Bowie, Haffa, and Mullins 2003). Given this trend, a theory of alliances that explains some aspects of both historical alliance behavior and the post–Cold War period’s frequent appearance of ad hoc coalitions would be valuable.

In this article, we study burden sharing in nonbinding alliances by taking countries’ outside options seriously, and our analysis suggests that costly search for ad hoc partners may be an important missing piece in theories of alliances. Our approach allows us to think systematically about how changes in search costs affect burden sharing and the probability of alliance breakdown. We find that initiators pay a disproportionate share of costs, that there is more free riding in a tight bipolar system than in a loose bipolar system, and that in multipolar systems, allies are unlikely to contribute enough to deter searching. These findings are consistent with historical data on burden sharing in alliances and better explains the fluctuations in NATO behavior than does the joint production model.

One may wonder how the results will change under alternative model specifications. First, what might we expect if “going it alone” is an option for the allies? In our model, we assumed that the cost to producing the collective good is sufficiently high that no single country would want to produce the good by itself. So in a trivial sense, the option of going it alone is dominated by not doing anything, and the game as we have written it does not depend on this choice. But suppose a single country has the choice of going it alone. In such a world, the initiator might still choose to search, depending on costs. It could also sell access to the collective good to its ally whose contribution is not essential in producing the good. Such a situation/model gives the initiating ally all the bargaining power and the ability to extract all the rents from the alliance. This is a simpler scenario than the one we have considered, and our formalization seems to have a broader empirical relevance and connects better to the existing alliance literature.

Second, what if not all allies are the same? Do the results hold for some natural variation in the quality of outside contributions? While we acknowledge that the model does not directly address the quality dimension, the logic of the propositions is robust to a reasonable interpretation of contribution quality. We might imagine that the contribution of an ad hoc ally is a function of both its nominal contribution and a type. Assume that a type is captured by an exchange/discount rate between a dollar from this particular ad hoc partner and the ally’s dollar, and further assume that such a country’s type was drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Then it is possible to show that the distribution of the effective contribution (i.e., the contribution determined by the country’s type × its nominal contribution) is also distributed uniformly on [0, 1], and all our analysis holds in this case.

Our analysis also suggests answers to the broader questions of why alliances exist and why they are credible. Some argue that alliances exist and are credible because they signal common interests among allies (Morrow 1994). Others argue that the repeated nature of countries’ interactions deters a state from reneging on its alliance commitments (Snyder and Diesing 1977). These studies invariably take anarchy as a threat to the maintenance of alliances. Our analysis suggests a very different answer to the questions: anarchy and outside options are what motivate states to form alliances and stick with them. In the classical model, without outside options, the country that initiates an allied action will not receive a positive net benefit. Therefore, if an alliance is an enforceable contract, the initiator is better off by not being a member. Being in an alliance while maintaining outside options, however, improves a country’s payoff in situations where the increase in search cost is not too large. In other words, our analysis suggests that countries join alliances because such institutions improve their overall welfare in an anarchic environment.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Suppose \( x_1 < \phi - 1 \). It must be the case that \( r_2 \geq \phi - 1 \); otherwise, \( r_2 = \phi - 1 \) is a profitable deviation for country 2 whether or not country 1 searches in the second period. Next, suppose \( x_1 \geq \phi - 1 \). It must be the case that \( r_2 \geq x_1 \); otherwise \( r_2 = x_1 \) is a profitable deviation for country 2 whether or not country 1 searches in the second period. Finally, if country 1 chooses to produce the good with the ad hoc partner when it is indifferent, then country 2 can profitably deviate by offering some slightly larger contribution, leading country 1 to produce the good with country 2. This proves the lemma.

Derivation of Table 1

We analyze country 1’s searching strategy and country 2’s contributing strategy in turn.

For country 1, the expected payoff from searching in the second period given that country 2 offers \( r_2 \) is

\[
\theta(r_2) = -c + \frac{r_2^2}{2} (1 - \phi + r_2) dx + \int_0^{r_2} (1 - \phi + x) dx, 
\]

which can be simplified to \( \theta(r_2) = -c + 3/2 - \phi + (r_2)^2/2 \). Note that \( \theta(r_2) \) is an increasing function of \( r_2 \).

Let \( r^* \) be the level of contribution that makes country 1 indifferent between searching and not searching in the second period. If country 1 accepts \( r^* \) and does not search, then its payoff is \( 1 - \phi + r^* \); if country 1 searches given \( r^* \), then its expected payoff from the search is \( \theta(r^*) = -c + 3/2 - \phi + (r^*)^2/2 \). Since country 1 is indifferent between the two choices, we have \( 1 - \phi + r^* = \theta(r^*) \). Solving the equality, we find \( r^* = 1 - \sqrt{2c} \). Because \( r^* \in [0, 1] \), \( c \in (0, 1/2) \). For each \( c \in (0, 1/2) \), \( r^* \) is unique, and it is decreasing in \( c \). Furthermore, since both \( 1 - \phi + t \) and \( \theta(t) \) are monotonically increasing in \( t \in [0, 1] \), with \( 1 - \phi + t \) increasing at a faster rate, the two functions can intersect only once. This means for all \( r_2 < r^* \), \( 1 - \phi + r_2 < \theta(r_2) \); and for all \( r_2 \geq r^* \), \( 1 - \phi + r_2 \geq \theta(r_2) \). Therefore, in the second period, country 1 searches if \( r_2 < r^* \) and does not search if \( r_2 \geq r^* \).

Now consider country 2’s contributing strategy in the second period. Country 2’s expected payoff in the second period depends on its level of contribution \( r_2 \):

\[
u_2(r_2) = \begin{cases} 
1 - r_2 & \text{if } r_2 < r^* \\
(1 - r_2)/2 & \text{if } r_2 \geq r^* 
\end{cases} \tag{1}
\]

We can show that in the second scenario, where \( r_2 < r^* \), country 2 gets 1/4 at most when \( r_2 = 1/2 \). Country 2’s best response then depends on the values of \( r^* \), \( x_1 \), and 1/2.

If \( r^* < 3/4 \) (or \( 1 - r^* > 1/4 \)), that is, if the most country 2 can get from inducing country 1 to search is no more than what it receives from satisfying country 1 outright, then country 2 offers \( r_2 = \max \{r^*, x_1 \} \); if \( r^* \geq 3/4 \) (or \( 1 - r^* \leq 1/4 \)), then country 2’s strategies are more complicated. Let \( r > 1/2 \) denote an offer by country 2 that leads country 1 to search but gives country 2 the same expected payoff as offering \( r^* \). That is, \( r > r \) is the solution to the equality \( 1 - r^* = (1 - r)r \). The relationship between \( r^* \) and \( r \) is shown in Figure 2. Because \( u_2(r_2) \) is concave in \( r_2 \), \( r \leq r^* \). The thresholds, \( r \), \( r^* \), and 1/2, mark the regions where the outside offer \( x_1 \) may fall and to which country 2 responds differently with its optimal offer. The equilibrium strategies in Table 1 for \( r^* \geq 3/4 \) can be derived straightforwardly by considering the scenarios for the four regions.

Finally, the preceding analysis assumes that country 1 searched in the first period, which is the more complicated case. If it did not search in the first period, then country 1’s decision problem is no longer constrained by the condition \( r_2 \geq \max \{x_1, \phi - 1 \} \). Therefore, if \( r^* < 3/4 \), then country 2 offers \( r^* \) and country 1 accepts; if \( r^* \geq 3/4 \), then country 2 offers 1/2 and country 1 searches.

Derivation of Table 2

First, let \( r^*_1 \) be country 2’s first-period offer that gives country 1 the same payoff as offering \( r^* \) in the second period. That is, \( r^*_1 \) is the solution to the equation \( 1 - \phi + r^*_1 = \delta (1 - \phi + r^*) \).

To characterize country 1’s strategy in the first period after a search, we require that the discount factor is sufficiently large, such that \( \delta \in [\hat{\delta}, 1] \), where \( \hat{\delta} = \{\min; 1 - \phi + s < \delta \theta(s), \forall s < r \} \). The condition locates the relative positions of the thresholds that are necessary to characterize the equilibrium strategies: \( r < r^*_1 \leq r^* \). Additionally, the condition implies that the discount factor does not change strategic incentives of country 1 in a significant way.

Specifically, if an offer from country 2, \( s \), induces country 1 to search in a one-period game (i.e., \( 1 - \phi + s < \theta(s) \)), then by the condition, the same offer leads country 1 to search in a two-period game as well (i.e., \( 1 - \phi + s < \hat{\delta}s \)) as long as the offer is sufficiently small, satisfying \( s < r \).

The derivation of country 1’s equilibrium strategy is straightforward: first distinguish the two scenarios where \( r^* < 3/4 \) and \( r^* \geq 3/4 \), and then consider all possible cases in each scenario indicated in Table 2. A detailed derivation can be found on the authors’ Web sites.18

Proof of Lemma 2

Proof. Assume \( \hat{\delta} \) is sufficiently large. Suppose \( r_1 \geq r^* \). If country 1 accepts \( r_1 \), then its payoff is \( 1 - \phi + r_1 \). If country 1 rejects and moves the game to the second period without search, at most it receives \( \hat{\delta}(1 - \phi + r^*) < 1 - \phi + r_1 \).
Therefore, country 1 either accepts \( r_1 \) immediately or searches and then accepts \( \max\{x_1, r_1\} \). By the definition of \( r^* \), we know \( 1 - \phi + r_1 \geq \theta(r_1) \), so country 1 accepts \( r_1 \) immediately.

Suppose \( r_1 < r^* \). If country 1 accepts \( r_1 \), then it gets \( 1 - \phi + r_1 \); if country 1 searches, then its payoff is bounded from below by \( \theta(r_1) \). Because \( 1 - \phi + r_1 < \theta(r_1) \) when \( r_1 < r^* \), searching is better than accepting. Where \( r_1 < r^* \), however, country 1 must consider both the option of searching and the option of moving directly to the second period. It can be shown that for both \( r^* < 3/4 \) and \( r^* \geq 3/4 \), the utility from moving to the second period directly is strictly less than the expected utility from searching, and country 1 searches for all \( r_1 < r^* \).

**Proof of Proposition 1**

Proof. Let \( \delta > \hat{\delta} \). If \( r^* < \phi - 1 \), country 2 will always prefer to accept a contribution that is big enough for the joint production of the public good. As a result, country 2 offers the minimal amount necessary, \( \phi - 1 \), and takes all the surplus.

Now suppose \( \phi - 1 \leq r^* < 3/4 \). By Lemma 2, country 1 accepts any offers \( r_1 > r^* \). So country 2 does not offer anything greater than \( r^* \). Suppose \( r_1 < r^* \). Then country 1 searches in the first period for sure. We consider two cases.

Suppose \( r_1 < r^* \), then with probability \( 1 - r^* \), country 1 produces the good with the ad hoc partner. With probability \( r^* \), however, country 1 cannot find a sufficiently large outside offer and the game reaches the second period. In the second period, country 2 offers \( r_2 < r^* \) and it gets accepted. Thus, the expected payoff for country 2 making offer \( r_1 < r^* \) is \( \delta(1 - r^*)^2 \), which is smaller than offering \( r^* \) to country 1 outright and getting \( 1 - r^* \).

Now suppose \( r^* \leq r_1 < r^* \). Then country 1 searches in the first period but the game does not reach the second period. The expected payoff for country 2 is \( r_2(1 - r_1) \leq 1/4 \leq 1 - r^* \), which means that it is better off offering \( r^* \) outright.

**Proof of Proposition 2**

Proof. First, note that country 2 never offers anything more than \( r^* \). By offering \( r^* \), country 2 guarantees that the offer gets accepted and the game ends. Now the question is whether there is an offer \( r_1 \in [0, r^*] \) that makes country 2 better off than offering \( r^* \). To find such an offer, which induces country 1 to search in the first period, we start by ruling out offers that are strictly dominated by other offers: (1) Offering \( r_1 \in [r^*, r^*] \) is strictly dominated by offering \( r^* \); (2) Offering \( r_1 \in (\delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi, r^* ) \) is strictly dominated by offering \( \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi \); (3) Offering \( r_1 \in [0, \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi] \) is strictly dominated by offering \( \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi \).

With the above analysis, in terms of country 2’s equilibrium strategy in the first period, one of two things must happen: country 2 offers \( r^* \), or country 2 offers some \( r_1 \in [\delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi, \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi] \) that is better than any other offer in the region. Exactly which one is country 2’s best response in the equilibrium depends on its expected utility from the two offers. If \( r_1 = r^* \), then country 1 accepts the offer immediately and country 2’s utility is \( 1 - r^* \). If country 2 offers \( r_1 \in [\delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi, \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi] \), country 1 could have two potential responses: accept after a search, or reject after a search and go to the second period.

For any \( r_1 \in [\delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi, \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi] \), it is straightforward to see that \( \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi + r_1 \leq \delta(\phi) \). By the monotonicity of the function \( \theta() \), therefore, there is a unique outside offer \( x_1 \in [1/2, r] \) that satisfies the equality \( 1 - \phi + r_1 = \delta(\theta(x_1)) \). Let \( x(r) \) denote such an outside offer. Then, country 2’s expected utility from offering \( r_1 \in [\delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi, \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi] \) is \( o(\phi) \), where

\[
o(\phi) = \int_0^{x_r(\phi)} (1 - r_1) dx_1 + \int_{x_r(\phi)} r_1 \delta(\theta(x_1(1 - x_1))) \delta(x_1) dx_1
\]

Let \( \hat{\phi} \) be the solution of the following constrained maximization problem:

\[
\max \{ o(\phi) \} \quad \text{s.t. } \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi \leq r_1 \leq \delta(\phi) - 1 + \phi.
\]
range for \( \hat{r}_1, \hat{r}_1 = \delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi \). Here we show that for \( \delta^* = \max(\delta_0, 0.8) \leq 1 \), for every \( \delta > \delta^* \), \( \omega(\delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi) > 1 - \hat{r}^* \). These three steps prove our proposition. A detailed proof can be found on the authors’ Web sites.19

**Proof of Proposition 3**

**Proof.** When \( c < 1/32 \), we are looking at the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 2. We show that \( \hat{r}_1 \) is continuous in the parameter space, and it is decreasing in \( c \).

Let \( G = [0, 1/32] \times [1, 3/2] \times [\delta^*, 1] \), with generic element \( (g) \in R^3 \). Then we can define the constraint set for the optimization problem in Proposition 2 to be

\[
\gamma(g) = \{ x \in R : \delta \theta(1/2) - 1 + \phi \leq x \leq \delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi \}. \tag{3}
\]

\( \gamma \) is a compact-valued continuous correspondence. Noting that \( \omega(r_1) : \gamma(g) \to R \) is continuous, and defining \( \gamma^* \) such that

\[
\gamma^*(g) = \{ x \in \gamma(g) : x \text{ maximizes } \omega(r_1) \text{ on } \gamma(g) \}, \tag{4}
\]

we have by Berge’s ([1963] 1997) theorem of the maximum, \( \gamma^*(g) \) is upper hemi-continuous on \( G \). Moreover, because \( \gamma^* \) is single valued in Proposition 2, \( \gamma^*(g) \) is a continuous function. See Border (1992).20

From the characterization in proposition 2, \( \gamma^*(g) \) can be expressed as the following continuous piecewise function:

\[
\gamma^*(g) = a_1(\delta \theta(1/2) - 1 + \phi) + a_2(\hat{r}_1) + a_3(\delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi) \tag{5}
\]

with

\[
a_1 = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \hat{r}_1 < \delta \theta(1/2) - 1 + \phi \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \tag{6}
\]

\[
a_2 = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \delta \theta(1/2) - 1 + \phi \leq \hat{r}_1 \leq \delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \tag{7}
\]

\[
a_3 = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \hat{r}_1 < \delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \tag{8}
\]

It can be easily shown that \( \delta \theta(1/2) - 1 + \phi, \hat{r}_1 \), and \( \delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi \) are all decreasing functions of \( c \), so \( \gamma^*(g) \), is decreasing in \( c \), proving the proposition.

**Note 17**

**Proof.** Since in the equilibrium characterized by proposition 1, the probability of an ad hoc coalition is zero, we turn to the case for the equilibrium of proposition 2. From the equilibrium strategies we have

\[
\Pr(\text{ad hoc coalition}) = \int_{\hat{r}_1}^1 \int_{x(\hat{r}_1)}^1 dy \, dx + \int_{\hat{r}_1}^1 dx = \int_{\hat{r}_1}^1 (1-x) dx + \int_{\hat{r}_1}^1 dx. \tag{9}
\]

Notice \( \hat{r}_1 \) and \( x(\hat{r}_1) \) are both directly functions of \( c \), so to keep this in mind, we write \( x(\hat{r}_1) = x(\hat{r}_1(c), c) \). By Leibniz’s rule,

\[
\frac{\partial \Pr}{\partial c} = \frac{\partial}{\partial c} \left( \left(1 - \hat{r}_1 - (1 - x(\hat{r}_1(c), c)) \frac{\partial x(\hat{r}_1(c), c)}{\partial c} + \frac{\partial \hat{r}_1}{\partial c} \right) \right) \tag{11}
\]

For a given set of \( (c, \delta, \phi) \), \( \partial \Pr/\partial c \) can be positive or negative; thus the probability of forming an ad hoc coalition can be increasing or decreasing. If, for example, we consider \( c = 1/40, \delta = .95, \phi = 1.15 \), we get that \( \partial \Pr/\partial c = -.765 \). If we set \( c = 1/75, \delta = .98, \phi = 1.4 \), then \( \partial \Pr/\partial c = 3.47 \).

**Proof of Proposition 4**

**Proof.** We start with the equilibrium characterized by proposition 1, where \( 1/32 \leq c \). In the equilibrium, country 2 makes an offer \( r^* \), and it is accepted by country 1. The expected payoff of country 1 with an alliance is then \( 1 - \phi + r^* \), and its expected payoff from searching without an alliance is \( \theta(\phi - 1) \) when \( c = 0 \), which equals to \( 3/2 - \phi + (\phi - 1)^2/2 \). So we need to evaluate the following inequality:

\[
W(c, \delta, \phi) = 1 - \phi + r^* - (3/2 - \phi + (\phi - 1)^2/2) \geq 0. \tag{12}
\]

If having an alliance is better, then we should have \( W(c, \delta, \phi) \geq 0 \). We find that for \( c \leq 1/8[1 - (\phi - 1)^2] \), \( W(c, \delta, \phi) \geq 0 \), which means that an alliance is better than no alliance, even though the alliance imposes search costs on its members. On the other hand, for \( 1/8[1 - (\phi - 1)^2] < c \leq 1/2 \), country 1 would prefer to have no alliance and search without cost.

For the remaining case when \( 0 \leq c < 1/32 \), it involves the equilibrium characterized by proposition 2. Country 2 could offer one of the three possible amounts: \( \delta \theta(1/2) - 1 + \phi, \hat{r}_1, \delta \theta(\hat{r}) - 1 + \phi \). Repeating the steps above for each case, the inequality in (12) is satisfied. This proves the proposition.

**References**


